A Republic of the Mind: Cognitive Biases, Fiscal Federalism, and Section 164 of the Tax Code by Galle, Brian
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 82 | Issue 3 Article 3
Summer 2007
A Republic of the Mind: Cognitive Biases, Fiscal
Federalism, and Section 164 of the Tax Code
Brian Galle
Florida State University College of Law, brian.galle@bc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Tax Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Galle, Brian (2007) "A Republic of the Mind: Cognitive Biases, Fiscal Federalism, and Section 164 of the Tax Code," Indiana Law
Journal: Vol. 82: Iss. 3, Article 3.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol82/iss3/3
A Republic of the Mind: Cognitive Biases, Fiscal
Federalism, and Section 164 of the Tax Code
BRIAN GALLE*
IN TRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 673
I. B ACKGROUN D .............................................................................................. 676
II. A STATE SUBSIDY? ........................................... . .. .. .. . .. .. . .. .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. .. .. . 680
A . R edistribution ..................................................................................... 680
B . D evolution .......................................................................................... 685
C . S pillovers ............................................................................................ 687
D . Why Not D irect Spending? ................................................................. 691
III. N o E xrr? ...................................................................................................... 696
IV. AN ENFORCEMENT INCENTIVE? .................................. .. .. .. . .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. ... .. . . 701
A. The Benefits of Overlapping Enforcement ......................................... 702
B . O bstacles ............................................................................................ 704
C. W ill It F loat? ...................................................................................... 708
C ON CLU SION .......................................................................................................... 709
INTRODUCTION
In its efforts to guide money to the states, our federal government annually passes
up more than $75 billion in potential revenue under a single provision of the Tax Code.
That provision, section 164 of the Code, allows itemizing taxpayers to deduct the cost
of the state and local income, property, and (to a limited extent) sales taxes they paid
during the tax year.' The eye-popping size of that number makes section 164 a
perennial issue in tax policy circles, and as one of the deductions omitted from the
Alternative Minimum Tax's (AMT) 2 parallel tax universe, the section is also a key
component of debates about the AMT. Indeed, the President's Advisory Panel on Tax
Reform recommends eliminating the deduction to pay for its proposed AMT reform.
3
* A.B. Harvard, J.D. Columbia, LLM (Taxation) Georgetown. Assistant Professor,
Florida State University College of Law. I am grateful for many helpful comments and
suggestions from, among others, Reuven Avi-Yonah, Brookes Billman, Bill Bratton, John
Buckley, Peter Byrne, John Colvin, Noel Cunningham, Mike Dorf, Tom Field, Vic Fleischer,
Martin Ginsburg, Robert Katzmann, Yoram Keinan, Edward McCaffery, Trevor Morrison,
Gregg Polsky, Julie Roin, David Schizer, David Weisbach, and Ethan Yale, as well as faculty
attending presentations of this paper at the National Tax Association Annual Conference,
Florida State University, the University of Minnesota, Quinnipiac, Southwestern, and Syracuse
Law Schools. I owe a particular debt to Ron Pearlman and Kirk Stark for their willingness to
read carefully and offer me extensive and insightful suggestions. All errors are my own.
1. 26 U.S.C.A. § 164 (2006); see STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG.,
ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2003-2007, at 20, 27 (Comm.
Print 2002).
2. 26 U.S.C.A. § 56(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2006).
3. THE PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FED. TAX REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR, AND PRO-
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
It has been almost a decade since Louis Kaplow produced the last comprehensive
legal academic examination of the merits of the deduction.4 This Article aims, humbly,
at attempting to update that earlier work with recent developments and new insights.
As I will explain more in a moment, the deduction also plays a so-far unrecognized
role in economists' debates about the efficiency of decentralized government.
To date, scholarly examination of the deduction has focused on its fairness, or
"horizontal equity," as well as the role it may play in encouraging localities to raise
more of their own tax revenues. My focus here is on the latter. One view I do not
consider, though, is the taxation of corporations and other entities. As I suspect the
reader will see, the nuances of individual taxation provide more than enough material
for one paper; corporations and their additional complexities must await another day.
On the fairness front, prevailing wisdom questions the traditional equitable
justification for the deduction. Under the traditional view, it was said, two people who
make the same money are not equal if one pays more state tax than the other.5 Thus,
the federal tax system should favor the higher-state-tax payer. Later critics argued that
this was considering only half the apple (or half the orange): state taxes generate
services, which increase taxpayer well-being. 6 So, the critics said, the higher-tax payer,
like a consumer who buys a product at retail, has less money in her pocket at the end of
7the year, but is just as well off as the taxpayer with more money but fewer services.
Further analysis showed that the equity question actually turned on complicated
empirical questions of who truly bore the burden of a given state tax-was it true, in
other words, that taxpayers got everything they paid for?8 Those questions, too, I
reserve for discussion elsewhere.
Instead, I focus here on challenges to the deduction's use as a "tax expenditure" or
subsidy. For example, the President's Advisory Panel on Tax Reform reportedly
believes that the deduction causes citizens to overinvest in local government because
that spending is tax-favored compared to private purchase of government-like services.
That echoes a claim raised by President Reagan's Treasury Department prior to the
1986 reforms.
9
GROwTH: PROPOSALS TO FIx AMERICA'S TAX SYSTEM 70, 83-84 (2005), available at
http://www.taxreformpanel.gov/final-report/ [hereinafter ADVISORY PANEL REPORT].
4. Louis Kaplow, Fiscal Federalism and the Deductibility ofState andLocal Taxes Under
the Federal Income Tax, 82 VA. L. REV. 413 (1996).
5. WILLIAM VICKREY, AGENDA FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION 18-24 (1947); Henry Aaron,
What is a Comprehensive Tax Base Anyway?, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 543, 543-44 (1969).
6. See 2 DEP'T OF TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC
GRowTH 63 (1984) [hereinafter TREASURY I]; 25 Standard Fed. Tax. Rep., Dep't of the
Treasury, The President's Tax Proposals to the Congress for Fairness, Growth and Simplicity
(CCH) 63 (1984); Brookes D. Billman & Noel B. Cunningham, Nonbusiness State andLocal
Taxes:The Casefor Deductibility, 28 TAX NOTES 1107, 1111-12 (1985); Charles R. Hulten &
Robert M. Schwab, A Haig-Simons-Tiebout Comprehensive Income Tax, 44 NAT'L TAX J. 67,
68-71 (1991); J.B. McCombs, A New Federal Tax Treatment of State andLocal Taxes, 19 PAC.
L.J. 747, 754 (1988); Daniel Shaviro, An Economic and Political Look at Federalism in
Taxation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 895, 907-08 (1992); Edward Yorio, The President's Tax Proposals:
A Major Step in the Right Direction, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1255, 1278 (1985).
7. TREASURY I, supra note 6, at 631; Hulten & Schwab, supra note 6, at 68-71.
8. See Kaplow, supra note 4, at 490.
9. See TREASURY I, supra note 6, at 63-64. For a similar view in the economic literature,
see Christian Kelders & Marko Kothenburger, Tax Incentives in Fiscal Federalism 3-4 (Nov.
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Whatever one's view about the economics of the Advisory Panel's argument,
whether or not it is of concern ultimately turns on whether we would like to see some
services now carried out by the federal government or in the private sector shifted to
state and local government. I argue here that, to the extent we may desire such a shift,
the deduction may be an imperfect tool for accomplishing it. The tax literature thus far
does not consider the possible effects of the deduction on the actual quality of state and
local governance. Yet local governments develop in response both to direct political
demands and also the indirect pressure generated by the threat of "exit," or out-
migration to a more efficient or more responsive jurisdiction. The deduction, I argue,
significantly affects both of these factors-most obviously by reducing exit pressures,
but also by transforming the processes of direct politics in more subtle ways.
Further, most commentators claim that the deduction is in theory warranted-albeit
administratively difficult to implement-in order to encourage local tax jurisdictions to
raise and spend money in ways that benefit their neighbors.'0 Since each locality fails
to internalize the benefits of these "spillovers," the argument goes, a deduction may
help to move local spending closer to the ideal level the localities would choose if their
incentives were properly aligned." My claim here is that in fact, localities do
internalize spillover benefits. Localities may use spillovers as a form of an inter-
jurisdictional bribe to influence the behavior of outsiders. In combination with a
variety of frictions and biases, that bribe allows the briber to reduce free riding by
neighbors and, in some instances, permits the briber to export the costs of its services
onto the unwitting bribees.
But this is not to say I am on the side of the President's Advisory Panel. While I
acknowledge flaws in the way that the deduction now functions, I also argue that
condemning the deduction on the basis of present failings could prove shortsighted.
The deduction can in fact be an important instrument for reforming the administration
of cooperative regulation between the federal government, states, and private
stakeholders.
In addition, the deduction may facilitate shared state and federal tax enforcement, a
necessity for states in a world where it is ever easier to hide wealth through complex
international transactions. For cognitive and distributional reasons, it may be difficult
for states to tax the same base as the federal government and therefore difficult for
them to most effectively share enforcement resources with it. The deduction arguably
offsets some of these "stacking" limitations. It also can be a centripetal force for what
would otherwise be an ever-diversifying set of state tax rules.
2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.Irz-muenchen.de/-ces/Marko/Fiscal
Federalism.pdf.
10. See, e.g., Billman & Cunningham, supra note 6, at 1112; Robert C. Ellickson, Cities
and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1519, 1554 (1982); Kirk J. Stark, Fiscal
Federalism and Tax Progressivity: Should the Federal Income Tax Encourage State andLocal
Redistribution?, 51 UCLA L. REv. 1389, 1410 (2004); Yorio, supra note 6, at 1280; cf Clayton
P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism and the Use of Municipal Bond Proceeds, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1030, 1045-46 (1983) (making this argument in context of tax-exempt municipal bonds).
11. See Gillette, supra note 10, at 1046; Kaplow, supra note 4, at 480-83; Stark, supra note
10, at 1410; cf. Wallace E. Oates, An Essay on Fiscal Federalism, 37 J. ECON. LIT. 1120, 1126-
27 (1999) (describing use of federal conditional grants to encourage localities to internalize
effects of spillovers); Yorio, supra note 6, at 1280-81 (arguing that deduction increases
beneficial spillovers without noting internalization problems).
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These conclusions, I should acknowledge at the outset, are first steps, not final ones.
The novel benefits of the deduction I identify might justify only a targeted or more
nuanced deduction. And the relative societal value of those goals is likely a sum that
can be computed only through the market of political ideas.
As for the roadmap of the Paper, Part I orients the reader in the mechanics of
section 164 and the extant policy arguments on either side. Part II considers the claim
that the deduction could function as a tax expenditure to subsidize state spending. I
analyze three distinct forms of spending that we might imagine the deduction could
subsidize and identify significant problems with all three. I conclude, however, that the
stability offered by the deduction may make it one among several viable tools for
locally-controlled redistributive taxing and spending. Part III outlines the possible
impact of the deduction on state and local governance, both in the current anarchic
state of that governance and in a possible "experimentalist" or collaborative regime
designed to remedy some of the pathologies of the present. Finally, Part IV explains
the benefits of shared tax enforcement and notes that depending on unresolved
empirical questions, the deduction may be helpful in achieving those benefits.
I. BACKGROUND
The federal deduction for state and local taxes paid is as old as the federal income
tax itself. For much of its life, though, it has been short on theoretical justification.
Most commentators initially seemed to view the deduction as simply an equitable
measure intended to put those who earned similar incomes in jurisdictions with
differing tax rates on an equal footing. 12 That equity explanation, though, foundered
somewhat in the face of the fact that the deduction was available only to itemizers.
3
Contemporary commentators are skeptical of the equity argument on other grounds,
as well. The central insight of the contemporary view is that state taxpayers get what
they pay for. 14 Local taxes, for example, pay for schools, filled potholes, plowed roads,
and support the rest of the basket of services a municipality might provide. Some
townships exact much higher taxes, but they also spend much more on services,
especially education. State taxes offer highways, statewide education grants, and
national guardsmen. In this view, the equity argument melts away. Two taxpayers
earning equal salaries in different jurisdictions might pay different tax rates, but they
are still equally well off.15 One has less money in her pocket, but she also has
purchased a set of services that leave her better off than her counterpart in the low-tax
jurisdiction. Ultimately, this turns out to be, at best, a very rough view of the actual
picture of tax-benefit tradeoffs. For purposes of this paper, though, my only goal is to
note that the prevailing view is that the equity justification for a deduction is fairly
weak, especially if one accounts for the administrative difficulties of more precise
measures of equity that depart from the assumption that services received equals taxes
paid.
16
12. See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 4, at 435-36.
13. See Stark, supra note 10, at 1414.
14. See sources cited supra note 6.
15. See TREASURY I, supra note 6, at 63; Hulten & Schwab, supra note 6, at 68-71.
16. See sources cited supra note 6. Professor Zelinsky, on the other hand, has argued for a
more granular analysis: he would grant a deduction for state taxes tied to state expenditures
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Some economists, however, have also suggested that the deduction could be viewed
as a tax incentive on behalf of state governments.' 7 That is, although the deduction
nominally is claimed by individual taxpayers, it was said that the benefit flowed in the
end to state taxing authorities.I8 In effect, the cost of any deductible state tax would
decline by its taxpayers' marginal federal rate. 19 That would, in theory, allow the state
to raise rates by the same margin without reducing the portion of state private output
devoted to taxation or, more importantly, without incurring any additional political
resistance. 20 Empirical studies seemed to bear out this analysis to some extent, showing
that states do tend to raise and spend somewhat more revenues from deductible than
from nondeductible taxes.
2
'
A concrete example here may be helpful. Suppose I earn $100,000, I itemize
deductions, and my federal marginal tax rate is 28%. Let us say that my home state
imposes a further 10% tax on my earnings. Without deductibility my take-home pay is
100,000 - [(100,000 * 0.28) + (100,000 * 0.10)] = $62,000. With deductibility, my
take home pay is increased to 100,000 - (100,000 * 0.10) - [(100,000 * 0.28) -
(10,000 * 0.28)] = $64,800. Knowing that I have received $2,800 from the federal
government, the state might respond by increasing its own taxes to recapture some of
my savings. Assuming that I was willing politically to tolerate a combined tax burden
that left me with $62,000 in the first instance, I may well be willing to accept the same
burden with some of the tax revenue now shifted to the state. This calculus also implies
that the deduction will be more useful to high-income and wealthy taxpayers, since
they are more likely to itemize (and therefore claim the deduction at all), have a higher
22federal marginal rate, and probably pay more state income and property taxes.
where the proper view of income would have resulted in federal deductibility if the same
expenditure had been made by an individual. Edward A. Zelinsky, The Deductibility of State
and Local Taxes: Income Measurement, Tax Expenditures and Partial, Functional
Deductibility, 6 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 9, 10-11 (1987). His primary example is healthcare costs. Id.
at 23.
17. See, e.g., Martin S. Feldstein & Gilbert E. Metcalf, The Effect of Federal Tax
Deductibility on State and Local Taxes and Spending, 95 J. POL. EcON. 710, 726 (1987);
Zelinsky, supra note 16, at 10; Gilbert E. Metcalf, Tax Exporting, Federal Deductibility, and
State Tax Structure, 10-12, 17 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 3839,
1991). For more on the basics of tax incentives and expenditures, see STANLEY S. SURREY &
PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 3 (1985). For ease of reference, I will advert to state
and local governments collectively as "state governments" unless distinguishing between the
two is important in context.
18. See ADvISORY PANEL REPORT, supra note 3, at 83; Lawrence B. Lindsey, Federal
Deductibility of State and Local Taxes: A Test of Public Choice by Representative Government,
in FISCAL FEDERALISM: QUANTITATIVE STUDIES 137 (Harvey Rosen ed., 1988).
19. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 133, 152 (2d ed. 1988).
20. Lindsey, supra note 18, at 138.
21. 25 Standard Fed. Tax. Rep., Dep't of the Treasury, The President's Tax Proposals to the
Congress for Fairness, Growth and Simplicity (CCH) 65 (1984); Bruce Bartlett, The Case for
Eliminating Deductibility of State and Local Taxes, 28 TAX NOTES 1121, 1122-23 (1985);
Douglas Holtz-Eakin & Harvey Rosen, Federal Deductibility andLocal Property TaxRates, 27
J. URB. ECON. 269, 271, 289, 291 (1990).
22. Kim Rueben & Len Burman, Deductibility of State and Local Taxes, 106 TAX NOTES
363, 363 (2005); Howard Chemick, On the Determinants of Subnational Tax Progressivity in
the U.S., 58 NAT'L TAX J. 93, 97 (2005); SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 17, at 3; cf. Metcalf,
supra note 17, at 14-15 (arguing that high-income taxpayers are the most politically influential
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Yet, as the President's Advisory Panel seemingly has concluded, the very
effectiveness of the deduction may subject it to criticism from advocates of classical
tax policy. As with many expenditures, the deduction is not "neutral"; that is, it distorts
the incentives of some economic actors. 23 As we have just seen, the deduction might
arguably encourage state governments to levy more taxes than they otherwise would,
since the additional tax in a sense is paid for by the federal government rather than by
the states' own taxpayers. If nothing else, the deduction very likely induces state taxing
authorities to shift their tax to those tax bases covered by the deduction in order to
maximize the revenue benefits from the federal government to their constituents.
24
That leaves us to grope for an explanation for why such distortions might be
desirable. If our only goal is to shift taxation from the federal government to the states,
why not simply lower federal rates across the board rather than giving the deduction?
Is there a good reason to think state governments would tax at less than optimal levels
without a deduction? The literature thus far offers two general answers. The first posits
that redistributive taxing and spending is difficult on the state level.25 To take the most
basic example, assume that individuals are rationally self interested, and that they can
easily gather and comprehend information about the relationship between the taxes
they pay and the benefits they realize, not only in their own jurisdiction but in a
number of others, each of which they could relocate to at little expense. In that
situation, we might expect that ajurisdiction that took money from Taxpayer A to give
to Taxpayer B might prompt A to move to a jurisdiction that did not. If Taxpayer A's
jurisdiction wants to keep her (and her tax dollars) from fleeing, it must reduce or
abandon its redistribution efforts. On the other hand, unless A wants to give up the
benefits of U.S. residency, it will be rather hard for her to escape redistributive taxing
by the national government.26 So the deduction might be a form of redistributive
federalism, in which the national government shares its tax dollars with states, enabling
the states to then soften the blow of their own redistributive taxes.27
Relatedly, some writers have also claimed that the deduction may be a way for the
federal government to encourage positive externalities. 28 Some of the things a state
in determining whether government shifts to deductible tax because they incur the largest
benefits). In this Article, I assume away any effects caused by the Alternative Minimum Tax
(AMT) on the ground that it is theoretically cleaner to analyze the deduction separately. At
present, though, the AMT would limit the extent to which the deduction is useful to high-
income taxpayers.
23. William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARv. L. REv.
309, 366-67 (1972).
24. See Lindsey, supra note 18, at 169; sources cited supra note 21.
25. See John Shannon, Federalism's Invisible Regulator: Interjurisdictional Competition,
in COMPETITION AMONG STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY IN
AMERICAN FEDERALISM 117, 118-19 (Daphne A. Kenyon & John Kincaid eds., 1991); William
W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics of Jurisdictional Competition:
Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best World, 86 GEO. L.J. 201, 212, 246, 248 & n. 196
(1997); Richard Briffault, "What About the 'Ism'?" Normative and Formal Concerns in
Contemporary Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1303, 1321 (1994); Henry W. Herzog, Jr. & Alan
M. Schlottmann, State and Local Tax Deductibility and Metropolitan Migration, 39 NAT'L TAX
J. 189 (1986).
26. See Gillette, supra note 10, at 1046 n.62.
27. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 25, at 248 n.196; Stark, supra note 10, at 1431.
28. See Billman & Cunningham, supra note 6, at 1112; Kaplow, supra note 4, at 481-83;
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spends its money on might benefit not only its own taxpayers but also its neighbors.
Good roads, clean air, safe shopping districts, and schools that produce potential
skilled employees all likely appeal nearly as much to nearby states as to the state
itself.29 And, in a sense, the existence of desirable locations other than those in which
we live might benefit us even if we do not directly enjoy their scenic vistas or top-tier
law schools. The opportunity to relocate when times get dark in our own neck of the
woods might be a form of insurance; it allows us to take risks with our own local
governance. Neighbors can be a source of best-practices to instruct us how to better do
our own governing. And the threat of easy relocation to an appealing alternative might
serve as a disciplining force on our current state government. The trouble is that each
individual state government has no obvious incentive to internalize all the benefits of
these positive externalities. 30 The deduction, some have suggested, moves in that
direction by at least encouraging state governments to spend in ways that might
produce some benefits to others.
3 1
Obviously, though, there are serious counterarguments to both of these claims.
Both, for example, seem to rely heavily on the assumption that states will make
beneficial use of the deduction rather than simply lowering their own tax burden. And
both make extensive assumptions about why and how easily people move from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. And neither offers a good reason, aside from
administrability, to push states to impose income, property, and sales taxes over any
others. I return to these problems later in the Paper.
In 1996, Harvard professor Louis Kaplow laid out another set of challenges for the
deduction. On the redistribution point, Kaplow argues that it is possible that subsidies
are not necessary to produce local redistribution.32 Programs we term "redistributive"
might result instead from a locality's view that such spending in fact produces good for
the whole community. If not, potential transferees might have enough political power
to extract transfers from others.33 In either case, he claims, redistribution is
indistinguishable from any other local government service. 34 His view of spillovers is
similar.35 Alternatively, where redistribution might be efficient or otherwise desirable
from a national perspective, Kaplow argues that we would be better off with direct
spending instead of a deduction.36 Deductions, he says, are regressive because they are
most valuable to taxpayers with higher income.37 They also are not especially well-
Stark, supra note 10, at 1410. But see TREASURY I, supra note 6, at 78 (arguing that spillover
effects are not beneficial enough to be worth the expenditure of the deduction).
29. See, e.g., Clayton Gillette, The Conditions ofInterlocal Cooperation, 21 J.L. & POL.
365, 365-66 (2005).
30. See Ellickson, supra note 10, at 1554.
31. See Gillette, supra note 10, at 1046; Kaplow, supra note 4, at 480-83; Stark, supra note
10, at 1410; Yorio, supra note 6, at 1280.
32. Kaplow, supra note 4, at 478-80.
33. Id. at 478-79.
34. Id. at 480. Kaplow's position, in other words, is that it is likely that no deduction is
appropriate in those circumstances because we should measure the subjective value of the tax
and redistribution package by the resident's choice to live in that community.
35. Id. at 481-83.
36. Id. at 477-78, 484.
37. See id. at 484-85. Our current system exacerbates this effect by allowing the deduction
only for itemizers, who are generally wealthier than those taking the standard deduction.
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targeted to reward only redistribution or spillover spending, and they offer little
transparency or political accountability to ensure that they are worth their cost.
38
My aim over the remainder of this Paper is to examine how durable these
conclusions prove in light of other claims based in fiscal federalism and regulatory
theory.
II. A STATE SUBSIDY?
The traditional view of the deduction as a tax subsidy rejects the claim that tax
preferences for state and local spending lead to too much local government. Again, the
basic argument here is that it is difficult for states to tax without driving away
taxpayers to lower-tax states; thus, federal subsidies help competing states by
transferring to them money from a federal jurisdiction that taxpayers cannot easily
escape.39 This position, which I will call the "state subsidy" view, has attracted
proponents as diverse as Marty Feldstein and Mario Cuomo. 40 Perhaps because of that
apparently broad agreement, its treatment in the legal literature is fairly thin, although
it has attracted at least two very persuasive critics. In this Part, I try to flesh out the
state subsidy explanation, and examine the skeptics' claims. Ultimately, I find the
subsidy argument somewhat tenable, but not generally for the reasons most
commentators have previously stated. And I conclude that the strongest arguments may
bring the subsidy directly into conflict with any effort to encourage states and the
federal government to tax the same base.
A. Redistribution
In its classic formulation, the tax expenditure argument for the deduction posits that
it is difficult for the states to impose some forms of taxation. Typically, the subsidy
proponent will begin her argument by noting that taxpayers may flee a high-tax
jurisdiction for a lower one, so that states race to the bottom of the bracket to prevent
population and capital leakage.4' Some taxpayers, however, may have chosen their
place of residence in order to, in effect, purchase a basket of services from their local
38. See id. at 485-86; Yorio, supra note 6, at 1280. I do not believe that these are inevitable
features of a tax system. But that is a subject for Part III.
39. Bratton & McCahery, supra note 25, at 248 & n. 196; Richard Briffault, Public Finance
in the American Federal System: Basic Patterns and Current Issues, 2 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 533,
539-40 (1996); see Stark, supra note 10, at 1431; Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Uneasy Casefor
Devolution of the Individual Income Tax, 85 IOWA L. REV. 907, 926 (2000).
40. See Feldstein & Metcalf, supra note 17, at 730-31; Michael I. Luger, Federal Tax
Reform and the Interjurisdictional Mobility Impulse, 23 J. URB. EcON. 235, 235 (1988).
41. See RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 181 (1959); Robin
Boadway, Maurice Marchand & Marianne Vigneault, The Consequences of Overlapping Tax
Bases for Redistribution and Public Spending in a Federation, 68 J. PUB. ECON. 453,453-54
(1998); Bratton & McCahery, supra note 25, at 248 & n. 196; Briffault, supra note 25, at 1314,
1321 (1994); D. Bruce LaPierre, PoliticalAccountability in the National Political Process-The
Alternative to Judicial Review of Federalism Issues, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 577, 594 (1985);
Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom "
Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1239-40 (1992).
[Vol. 82:673
A REPUBLIC OF THE MIND
government.42 In this view, the downward pressure on state taxes results from the
subset of taxpayers who believe they pay for more than they get from state government
and would prefer that it were otherwise.43 Indeed, many proponents of the state subsidy
theory therefore suggest that the subsidy's purpose is not to support state spending
generally, but rather to ensure the possibility of state redistributive spending. 44
In the abstract, states might cooperate or negotiate to prevent destructive rate
competition.45 It is generally thought, though, that cooperation among states (other than
through the federal government) is unlikely to be sustainable because of the high
transaction costs in reaching agreement with so many otherjurisdictions and because of
the large benefits that would flow to defectors from any tax cartel.46
Taxation at the federal level largely mitigates both of these problems.47 It is much
easier for the federal government, whose tax authority it is very difficult for individuals
to escape, to extract more than it gives to an individual. The deduction then returns
some of the resulting extra revenue capacity to states.48 That claim is somewhat at odds
with the view of the President's Advisory Panel, which apparently believes that
favorable tax treatment encourages overconsumption of state government.49
Predictably, though, there are some potential holes in this theory.
First, it may not be quite right that the States cannot effectively impose
redistributive taxes. Some economists suggest that in certain circumstances the
existence of a tax in jurisdiction A may actually encourage jurisdiction B to impose a
similar tax.50 Suppose, for instance, that we have neighboring states A and B. A
imposes a luxury tax on the sale of African diamond-crusted widgets (ADCWs).
Demand for ADCWs now shifts to B, where, in all likelihood, it drives up the price.
42. See sources cited supra note 6.
43. See sources cited supra note 25.
44. See RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 454-55 (5th ed. 1989); WALLACE E. OATES, FISCAL FEDERAUSM 6-8, 137-40 (1979);
Billman & Cunningham, supra note 6, at 1112. In this section I take a particularly broad view of
redistribution; I include not only single-year transfers from wealthy to indigent, but also inter-
temporal transfers from current taxpayers to later taxpayers in the form of capacity building,
capital investment, and other outlays that may be of more benefit to those in the future than they
are to those who pay for them now.
45. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 25, at 248.
46. See Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
1911, 1971 n.280 (1995); Thomas S. Ulen, Economic and Public-Choice Forces in Federalism,
6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 921, 927 (1998).
47. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 25, at 212; Briffault, supra note 39, at 539; Oates,
supra note 11, at 1128; Ulen, supra note 46, at 948; cf Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Passport to
Toledo: Cuno, the World Trade Organization, and the European Court of Justice, 108 TAX
NOTES 1661, 1665 (2005) (making a similar argument with respect to international flow of
capital in response to nation-state tax efforts).
48. See Boadway, Marchand & Vigneault, supra note 41, at 475; Briffault, supra note 39,
at 545-46.
49. Other economists have made a similar argument. See Kelders & Kothenburger, supra
note 9, at 3-5.
50. See, e.g., Ravi Kanbur & Michael Keen, Jeux Sans Fronti~res: Tax Competition and
Tax Coordination When Countries Differ in Size, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 877, 879-81 (1993); Jack
Mintz & Henry Tulkens, Commodity Tax Competition Between Member States of a Federation:
Equilibrium and Efficiency, 29 J. PUB. ECON. 133 (1986).
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Perhaps money now flows from B to African widget-makers who have integrated their
wholesale and retail businesses. At some point, the price in B and tax rate in A reach
an equilibrium point at which buyers are indifferent between purchases in either state.
In this scenario, state B has a fairly clear-cut incentive to impose its own luxury tax.
Since the incidence of A's tax rests in part on consumers in B,51 and that money
benefits either A's citizens or African widget-makers, B would be better served
imposing a tax that brought its own ADCW prices to the equilibrium point and keeping
the resulting money in benefits for B residents. Obviously, this example is exceedingly
simplified, especially in that it is built to exclude the possible effects of changes in
wage rates and return to capital in the event that some ADCW manufacturers or
retailers are themselves residents of A or B.
The point here is that the possibility that states can sometimes export the burden of
their taxes may lead to upwards, rather than downwards, tax pressure. However, no
good data seem to exist to show how often, if at all, this actually occurs. In general,
while economists agree that state tax levels may often be set below a level that would
exist absent inter-state competition, it is difficult to predict just how far they will likely
fall in light of possible countervailing pressures.5 2
Second, we might wonder whether in fact exit is a significant source of downward
pressure on redistributive taxation. Certainly, as we saw, there are major frictions that
limit exit. But credible threats of exit are likely more important than exit itself 53 Many
commenters on earlier drafts of this Article also wondered whether people really
relocate for tax reasons. Limited empirical data suggest that tax is, in fact, a significant
motivator in relocation decisions at least of wealthy individuals and small business
owners (who are usually taxed only as individuals because their businesses are taxed as
pass-through entities).54 Those data are especially significant in light of the possibility,
51. I assume as part of the hypothetical that A has in place some strategy that allows it to
blunt possible in-migration from taxpayers in B. For example, A might conceal from outsiders
the amount or quality of its services.
52. See Oates, supra note 11, at 1136-37.
53. Cf Kim Rueben, The Impact ofRepealing State andLocal Tax Deductibility, 2005 ST.
TAx NOTES 497, 511 (suggesting that fear that high-income households will leave in the absence
of deduction will drive down state and local taxes and services). I develop this point more
extensively in Part III. See infra text accompanying notes 136-39, 156. In brief, office holders
fear that exit will reflect poorly on them in future elections, and they lack information to assess
the credibility of most exit threats. Therefore, they act as though threats have force, even though
they know that many are in fact irrational.
54. See SALLY WALLACE, GA. STATE UNIV., THE EFFECT OF STATE INCOME TAX STRUCTURE
ON INTERSTATE MIGRATION, 7-8 (2002); Karen Smith Conway & Andrew J. Houtenville,
Elderly Migration and State Fiscal Policy: Evidencefrom the 1990 Census Migration Flows, 54
NAT'L TAX J. 103, 119-21 (2001); Charles E. McClure Jr., The Nuttiness of State and Local
Taxes-and the Nuttiness of Responses Thereto, 25 ST. TAX NOTES 841, 842-47 (2002); Jon
Bakija & Joel Slemrod, Do the Rich Flee From High State Taxes? Evidence From Federal
Estate Tax Returns 1-36 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10645,2004); cf
Amy Feldman, Fifty States, a Thousand New Tax Laws, INC., June 2005, at 21 (advising
taxpayers, apparently in all seriousness, to move to a tax haven in response to confusing state
tax laws). Lior Strahilevitz also points out that there is strong evidence that individuals move in
response to cost of living considerations, which necessarily include tax effects. Strahilevitz,
supra note 39, at 929-30; see also Richard J. Cebula, Internal Migration Determinants: Recent
Evidence, I 1 INT'L ADV. ECON. RES. 267, 272 (2005) (describing evidence that cost of living
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as I suggest in more detail later, that the existence of the deduction itself dampens
mobility. That we can measure some mobility effect notwithstanding the influence of
the deduction suggests that exit, and exit-driven downward pressures, would be rather
greater in its absence.55 Depending on how strong the downward pressure is, that
conclusion could imply that the President's Panel is wrong that the deduction creates
overconsumption of state government, rather than helping to balance out the downward
pressure exerted by interstate competition.
A more potent objection, then, might be that it is unclear why we should prefer
redistributive spending by the states to similar spending by the federal government.
Professor Stark, for example, has recently argued that as a "normative" matter we
should prefer federal to state redistribution.5 6 That is, he claims that exit is inefficient
because of the deadweight losses that attach to gathering information and uprooting.
5 7
But one of the main arguments usually offered in favor of federalism is that it is
efficient.58 Exit is supposed to ensure that resources flow to where they are most useful,
and to chasten local governments to be more efficient.59 The question then becomes
influences choices of where to live). There is some possibility, though, that individuals may
receive higher salaries in order to offset higher taxes. Intuitively we might think that this would
depend on how easily local taxes are measurable by an employer and how elastic or inelastic the
wage curve is. The available data look consistent with this intuition; they suggest that wages rise
to cover taxes only for some jobs in some regions and only for income taxes, rather than
property or sales taxes, which would be harder for employers to adjust for. WALLACE, supra, at
21-22.
55. I read some of the empirical evidence to support this inference. For example, one study
reported that older taxpayers' locational decisions were more sensitive to sales tax changes than
they were to differences in property and income tax. Conway & Houtenville, supra note 54, at
120. Although that seems hard to explain as a personal preference (do the elderly really
consume less real property than other goods?), it makes quite a bit of sense when we realize that
sales taxes are not usually deductible but property and income taxes are.
56. Stark, supra note 10, at 1395.
57. Id. at 1408. As a sidenote, the arguments Stark summarizes for why redistribution may
not prompt exit are consistent with our current hypothesis that taxpayers do move to avoid
genuine redistribution. He notes that some communities might willingly move money from
wealthier taxpayers to the less wealthy in order to satisfy the community's sense of charitable
obligation and to prevent crime. Id. at 1409; see also Lee Anne Fennell, BeyondExit and Voice:
User Participation in the Production of Local Public Goods, 80 TEx. L. REv. 1, 4 (2001). As
Kaplow points out, that is not redistribution; it is consumption. See Kaplow, supra note 4, at
474-79. I address here only redistribution that is viewed subjectively by the payers as a net loss.
58. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEvOTER HYPOTHESIS: How HOME VALUES INFLUENCE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND USE POLICIES, at ix (2001); Vicki
Been, "Exit" as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional
Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 473,475-76 (1991); Briffault, supra note 39, at 540;
Wallace E. Oates, An Essay on Fiscal Federalism, 37 J. ECON. LIT. 1120, 1121-23 (1999).
59. See PAUL E. PETERSON, THE PRICE OF FEDERALISM 17-18, 25-26 (1995); Briffault,
supra note 39, at 540; Robert G. Lynch, Weaknesses in the Common Arguments for State and
Local Tax Cuts and Incentives, 32 ST. TAX NOTES 597, 602 (2004); Michael W. McConnell,
Federalism: Evaluating the Founders'Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1484, 1498-1500 (1987). As
we have seen, there are many barriers to exit that call the efficiency of any exit-driven system
into question. However, a market may be chastened even by a relatively small segment of its
participants. See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 4, at 442.
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whether the supposed efficiency losses that attend localized redistribution predominate
over the efficiency gains of dispersed delivery of government services.
60
Although I may sound skeptical, I do in fact agree that local redistribution may
sometimes be inferior to national efforts. As other writers have described, it is possible
to design national systems in a way that permits, even magnifies, the diversity and
autonomy benefits of federalism. 61 A central federal authority regulating in
collaboration with the states can serve as a clearinghouse for information, force states
to be more forthcoming about the quality of the services they are delivering, render the
data in a way that facilitates comparison, and thereby perhaps encourage migration
from laggards.62 Of course, not all federal spending programs are designed so well. For
now, though, the comparative efficiency debate looks like it might be a draw.
A key point, however, is that the deduction may itself affect the efficiency both of
state and federal governance. I discuss in the next Part some ways in which the
deduction may actually degrade the quality of state government, an outcome that
certainly gives us pause about the wisdom of encouraging redistribution by those
governments. Still, the tax system may offer its own potential to ensure that the funds it
disburses to states for redistribution are well spent. It should be possible, in theory, to
create a sort of market for the deduction, in which states are rewarded for transparency
and penalized (by the market or regulators) for highly inefficient outcomes. In that
situation we would be inclined to say that the "normative" case against using the
deduction to encourage state-level redistribution is weak.
In sum, there is only moderate bite to claims by critics that fiscal supports for state
government redistributive projects distort the market for state government. Rather,
federal subsidies generally restore consumer choice to a marketplace otherwise
crippled by collective action problems. As Professor Kaplow argued, the case for using
tax deductions, rather than direct spending, to achieve that end is not at this point as
clear cut.63 There are tradeoffs between the tax and spending alternatives that may
60. There is no real agreement in the economic literature on this point. For summaries by
some of the primary combatants, see Wallace E. Oates, Fiscal Competition and European
Union: Contrasting Perspectives, 31 REGIONAL SCI. & URB. ECON. 133 (2001); John Douglas
Wilson & David E. Wildasin, Capital Tax Competition: Bane or Boon, J. PUB. ECON. 1065
(2004); George R. Zodrow, Reflections on the Economic Theory ofLocal Tax Incentives, 28 ST.
TAX NoTEs 891, 893-94 (2003) (setting out conflicting views of the efficiency of permitting
redistributive taxing and spending on the local level); George R. Zodrow, Tax Competition and
Tax Coordination in the European Union, 10 INT'L TAX & PUB. FIN. 651 (2003). My argument
in the next Part is that these debates overlook some of the potential impact of the deduction
itself.
61. See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 CoLuM. L. REv. 267, 314, 321 (1998); Gerald E. Frug, Beyond Regional
Government, 115 HARv. L. REv. 1763, 1824-25 (2002); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as
Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New
Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257, 321-23 (2001); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of
Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REv. 342,
402-46 (2004); Martha Minow, Lecture, Reforming School Reform, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 257,
287 (1999); Philip J. Weiser, Cooperative Federalism and Its Challenges, 2003 MICH. ST. L.
REv. 727, 728-29.
62. See, e.g., Dorf& Sabel, supra note 61, at 299-301, 322, 347, 354, 444.
63. Kaplow, supra note 4, at 477-78, 484.
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warrant choice of one or the other in different circumstances, a problem I return to
shortly in Part II.D.
B. Devolution
There is another challenge for the state subsidy theory. Recall the argument,
generally advanced in the context of analyses of the "tax equity" of the deduction, that
annually state taxes paid roughly equal the benefits a given individual taxpayer
receives. 64 To this we could add a claim that even redistributive spending might be
viewed by some as a form of consumption, in that it creates the conditions for a
thriving society, represents social insurance, or the like.65 Further, we might argue, with
Kaplow, that while taxpayers might desire to free ride on such benefits where they can,
at bottom their choice of where to live often fully reveals how much they are willing to
pay for government. 66 Under those premises, it quickly becomes difficult to see the tax
expenditure argument for the deduction. If there is a rough equilibrium in most
jurisdictions between taxes and services then there is no race to the bottom to avoid
burdensome transfer payments. Taxpayers may relocate to find their desired level of
taxing and spending, but they lose as much as they gain if they prefer more services
and flee to a low-tax, low-service state.
There is a residual argument for the state subsidy position-really an argument that
was there all along. We only care about whether states are able to tax if we are in favor
of state spending. Quite possibly, we could respond to the fact that states cannot raise
much revenue by shrugging, and then taxing and spending almost exclusively at the
federal level. So the state subsidy claim is really a claim about federalism--that local
spending is better, whether because it facilitates nationwide experimentation,
maximizes autonomy, encourages a spirit of community, or achieves some other
similar set of values that we might imagine.67 The particulars are not important just yet.
The point is that the deduction would have the effect of moving money from federal
hands to state hands so that, without necessarily changing the amount of government
services purchased nationwide, we would reduce the scope of federal operations and
increase the money-and presumably the opportunities to regulate-available to states.
The question now arises why we need the deduction to accomplish that goal. It
seems like we could well get to the same bottom line simply by cutting federal taxes
across the board. Assuming that some localities have a preference for the level of
combined services already delivered by the federal and state governments, they ought
to respond by raising their own taxes to make up for the diminished federal demands
and deliveries. Indeed, it is quite likely that many taxpayers prefer locally delivered
64. See supra text accompanying notes 12-15. It is worth reminding the reader that I limit
my scope here to the taxation of individuals. The incidence of entity taxation and the possible
responses by entities are, if possible, more complex than for individuals.
65. See, e.g., LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND
JUSTICE 17-19 (2002); Deborah Geier, Letter to the Editor, Time to Bring Back the "Benefit"
Norm?, 33 TAX NOTES INT'L 899, 900-01 (2004).
66. See Kaplow, supra note 4, at 479.
67. See, e.g., Bratton & McCahery, supra note 25, at 215-16 (noting view that "locally
adopted regulation more likely approaches the ideal of consonance with citizen preferences");
McConnell, supra note 59, at 1494. But see Shaviro, supra note 6, at 960 (stating that these
arguments "have some validity but relatively limited consequences").
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services to nationalized services. So these taxpayers should, if anything, be happy to
take up federal slack with state wind.
Research by tax scholars and psychologists suggests, however, that things are rarely
so clear cut.68 In some experiments, voters were unlikely to treat different groups of
taxes with identical incidence as a single interchangeable mental category, "tax.'
69
That result is contrary to our initial assumption that taxpayers are likely indifferent to
different allocations between federal and state taxes in their overall tax burden. Study
participants were similarly unlikely to be able to keep track of both the taxes and the
benefits those taxes bought, a phenomenon the researchers dubbed the "isolation
effect" or the "disaggregation bias. '70 The real-world prediction that flows from these
effects is that voters will be discontent about decreased federal services, but also
hostile to higher state taxes. That is, taxpayers will fail to put together the fact that their
taxes and services have shifted from the federal level to the state level; they will more
likely notice, and be angry at, higher state taxes and lower federal services. That is
especially likely if state taxes are highly "salient," or imposed in a form very noticeable
by the taxpayers. Thus, they may resist new state taxes, even if to pay for services
shifted from the federal level. So federal tax cuts may simply lead to smaller
government, even if the actual preference of the electorate is for more regulation.7'
The deduction responds to this type of problem by tying any decrease in federal tax
levels to higher state tax levels.72 Of course, the effectiveness of the deduction itself is
probably also limited by the isolation effect. The deduction will likely not be fully
effective at lessening the sting of higher state taxes, because many taxpayers will not
68. See, e.g., EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY & JONATHAN BARON, THINKING ABOUT TAX 2-4
(2004), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=-567767 [hereinafter MCCAFFERY & BARON,
THINKING]; William Simonsen & Mark D. Robbins, The Influence of Fiscal Information on
Preferences for City Services, 37 Soc. SCI. J. 195, 196 (2000) (summarizing mixed data on
whether citizens recognize that higher services require higher taxes).
69. EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY & JONATHAN BARON, THE HUMPTY DUMPTY BLUEs:
DISAGGREGATION BIAS IN THE EVALUATION OF TAX SYsTEMs 6 (2002), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/abstract =298648 [hereinafter McCAFFERY & BARON, HUMPTY DUMPTv];
EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY & JONATHAN BARON, THE POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY OF REDISTRIBUTION
26-28 (2005), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=695305 [hereinafter McCAFFERY & BARON,
REDISTRIBUTION].
70. McCAFFERY & BARON, REDISTRIBUTION, supra note 69, at 32, 36; Simonsen &
Robbins, supra note 68, at 207-10 (finding that providing taxpayers with additional information
about tax levels changes their previously stated preferences for services); Soren Winter & Poul
Erik Mouritzen, Why People Want Something for Nothing: The Role ofAsymmetrical Illusions,
39 EuR. J. POL. RES. 109, 110-12 (2001) (describing studies showing voters with internally
inconsistent opinions about taxing and spending sides of public fiscal policy).
71. See MCCAFFERY & BARON, REDISTRIBUTION, supra note 69, at 47-48.
72. See Gillette, supra note 10, at 1052-53 (noting that the federal government uses
matching grants to ensure that its contribution to the state will not be used simply to decrease
the state's tax burden).
The economics literature suggests in fact that in many cases these types of "matching" grants
prompt even more spending by the recipient than we would expect from purely rational
behavior. James R. Hines, Jr. & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Flypaper Effect, 9 J. EcON.
PERSP. 217, 218-20 (1995) (summarizing studies). Some economists theorize that this disparity
may be due to failure either of the general public or of representatives to keep separate "mental
accounts" of the grant benefits and their budgets as a whole. Id. at 222-24.
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associate their higher state bill with the lower federal bill. But a purely devolutionary
deduction can also make use of the disaggregation bias. To maximize the usefulness of
the deduction, the federal government could allow the deduction to recognize as wide a
variety of state taxes as the states can invent. By spreading its tax burden over many
small taxes, each with its blow somewhat cushioned by a federal deduction, the state
might rather reduce the salience of its tax burden.73 That, in turn, may make it feasible
that the decline in federal revenue will actually be matched by a corresponding
expansion of state proceeds.
The attentive reader no doubt has noticed that I have sprinkled this discussion with
qualifiers. I confess that many of my conclusions, such as they are, turn on the actual
psychological effects of differently structured tax regimes. They are, in other words,
guesses. More empirical work in these areas may give us more confidence in the
accuracy of our guesses. For now, though, it looks as though a purely devolutionary-
targeted deduction could conceivably be somewhat effective, especially if it allows
taxpayers to claim a wide variety of state taxes.
Even so, that leads us to the question of whether we ought to manipulate, rather than
try to dispel, voter misconceptions. The deduction here seems both to respond to and
also trade in the fact of taxpayer cognitive biases. Biases are not necessarily inflexible;
research suggests individuals can be "debiased. 74 Other commentators argue that,
given proper incentives, the market will iron out bias, or some individuals may attempt
to overcome cognitive bias either on their own or with the help of feedback from
nongovernmental sources. 75 It seems unwise, and perhaps even illegitimate, to make
social policy whose basis depends on ignorance or misunderstanding. If we are
committed to devolution, then, the better route might be to educate or motivate voters,
not to manipulate their perceptions. 76 Thus, there is another front for more and better
empirical work: how can we make debiasing work, and can we make it work at a cost
of less than the deduction's $75 billion sticker?
C. Spillovers
There is one last aspect of the state subsidy view we have not yet considered. Local
spending, we have seen, can serve not only residents of the locality but also their
neighbors. The present wisdom is that each such locality is undermotivated to produce
these kinds of "spillover" benefits.77 Supposedly, states do not internalize the gains
their spending provides to others. 8 If that is true, then they will have no particular
incentive to allocate their resources in a way that people who reside outside their own
73. MCCAFFERY & BARON, THINKING, supra note 68, at 26.
74. Id. at 14, 18; Linda Babcock, George Loewenstein & Samuel Issacharoff, Creating
Convergence: Debiasing Biased Litigants, 22 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 913, 916 (1997).
75. On the latter argument, see Jonathan Klick &Gregory Mitchell, Government Regulation
of Irrationality: Moral and Cognitive Hazards, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1620, 1624-26, 1652-53
(2006).
76. McCAFFERY & BARON, REDISTRIBUTION, supra note 69, at 60.
77. Ellickson, supra note 10, at 1554.
78. Gillette, supra note 10, at 1044 nn.60-61; see also Richard Briffault, The Local
Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1115, 1147 (1996)
(making this argument outside of the tax context).
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borders can enjoy. 79 The deduction, in this view, might make up for what would
otherwise be an underproduction of good spillovers.80 Of course, there are some
administrative challenges in making sure that the deduction is cost effective (for
example, in targeting it to jurisdictions that benefit their neighbors the most), but these
perhaps are not insuperable. The larger difficulty for this theory, I suggest here, is that
it is wrong that states do not internalize the benefits of the spillovers they produce. In
particular, states can use spillovers as a way of bribing nonresidents not to move in,
which can benefit the state in two distinct ways.
1. The Benefits of Bribery
The first benefit to states flows from the fact that in a nation where interstate
movement is inefficient, states can in theory export some of their tax burden. 81 To see
how this works, start with a model where there are no frictions. To take a simple
example, sales taxes are a classic way that a state can pay for some of its services with
money supplied by outsiders-tourists and other short-term visitors-who consume
relatively little in the way of some services, such as education and health care.82 Hotel
taxes are an especially good example since, generally they only indirectly affect the
state's own residents. 83 But in a frictionless republic, the sales-tax state's citizens
would not be able to realize the benefits of exporting their tax.84 The hotel-tax state is a
bargain relative to its neighbors, so that their citizens now move into the state,
consuming services, driving up the cost of real estate, and driving down wages.
85
The hotel-tax jurisdiction has two main options in the frictionless republic, neither
very likely to succeed in allowing it to export its tax burden. First, it can simply pay a
cash bribe to prospective immigrants to stay home. 86 Since the transaction costs of
79. Briffault, supra note 39, at 540-41; Ellickson, supra note 10, at 1554-55; Gillette,
supra note 10, at 1046-47.
80. See Gillette, supra note 10, at 1046 n.61; Kaplow, supra note 4, at 480-83; Stark, supra
note 10, at 1408; cf Yorio, supra note 6, at 1280-81 (arguing that deduction increases
beneficial spillovers without noting internalization problems).
81. I should note here that the possibility of tax exporting is not necessarily a policy
outcome to be avoided at the cost of other goals. See, e.g., Shaviro, supra note 6, at 961-63
(arguing that tax exporting is at least unobjectionable in some circumstances). But for our
purposes, the fact that some ofajurisdiction's costs are borne by outsiders would weigh against
a federal tax deduction, because it indicates that the jurisdiction is getting more in services than
it is paying for. See Kaplow, supra note 4, at 422.
82. See Shaviro, supra note 6, at 911.
83. Id. The state's residents are affected if the increased price for hotel rooms drives down
demand, resulting in reduced return to capital for local hotel investors and possibly fewer jobs
or lower wages for local workers.
84. See Gillette, supra note 10, at 1046 n.61; Kaplow, supra note 4, at 480-83; Stark, supra
note 10, at 1408; cf Yorio, supra note 6, at 1280-81 (arguing that the deduction increases
beneficial spillovers without noting internalization problems).
85. See Russell R. Krelove, Efficient Tax Exporting, 25 CANADIAN J. ECON. 145, 154
(1992); cf Shaviro, supra note 6, at 908 (describing the distortionary effects of tax exporting).
86. Cf Robin Boadway & Frank Flatters, Efficiency and Equalization Payments in a
Federal System of Government: A Synthesis and Extension of Recent Results, 15 CANADIAN J.
ECON. 613, 627 (1982) (describing the possibility of using federal-level grants to equalize tax
revenues, and thereby make investors indifferent about where to allocate capital).
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direct bargaining are likely to be immense, it would have to use some central authority
to distribute its bribes; the federal government seems like a fine candidate. But even if
transaction costs can be minimized, bribery should not really work, because no
rational, fully-informed carpetbagger will accept a bribe of less than the value of the
bargain she would be getting in good old Hotel Tax City (HTC). The State might also
try another form of bribery-producing its services in a way that can also be used
relatively costlessly by the neighbors who are bearing its tax burden. Again, though,
that does not quite work. Having a clean, accessible, and safe vacation spot next door,
filled with well-educated potential employees, is dandy. But, all else being equal, it is
not as good as living there.
Frictions make bribery and deception viable strategies. If the benefit of living in
HTC is $100, and it costs $50 to move there, a successful bribe obviously costs only
$50, which may make HTC's tax-exporting scheme economically viable. Probably of
greater significance is the fact that prospective immigrants likely cannot easily get an
accurate estimate of the value of living in HTC, and even with complete information
may face cognitive problems in understanding and accurately evaluating the
information they acquire. Information about alternative jurisdictions is expensive to
gather and hard to interpret.87 Despite some laudable efforts by courts to ensure that
local governance will remain "transparent," the fact is that some public services are
difficult to compare.88 As we will see, localities have conflicting incentives on whether
or not to generate data that would be useful to outsiders, and without local cooperation,
critical information may be impossible to obtain. In addition, because public goods
may be bundled in different ways, the prospect of moving presents taxpayers with
significant decision costs; they have to evaluate not one, but hundreds of different
potential tradeoffs. 89 And, as we saw, citizens may have trouble keeping together in
their minds both the taxing and spending sides of the ledger in the respective
jurisdictions. If the "endowment effect" is real, 90 we can expect many individuals to
overestimate the value of the services that they are already receiving.
Thus, even in a two-jurisdiction model, in which bundling problems are nonexistent
and decision costs are relatively low, a successful bribe probably could be priced at
considerably below the per capita fiscal advantage of tax exporting. That is crucial for
larger models, in which the number of prospective immigrants widens far beyond the
small group of neighbors upon whom a jurisdiction is able to impose its own costs. The
bribery story seems even more plausible if we think that moving and information-
gathering costs increase with distance, so that even as the circle ofjurisdictions laden
with potential newcomers widens, the bribe necessary to keep them at bay diminishes.
9 1
87. Bratton & McCahery, supra note 25, at 235; Shaviro, supra note 6, at 964-65.
88. See Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored
Quarter: Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985, 1988 (2000);
Wallace E. Oates, On Local Finance and the Tiebout Model, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 93,93 (1981).
89. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 25, at 223-25; Shaviro, supra note 6, at 964-65.
90. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests of the
Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990); Richard Thaler,
Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. EcoN. BEHAV. & ORG. 39 (1980)
(discussing the endowment effect theory).
91. As I suggested, this analysis also implies that states have an interest in deceiving
outsiders about the mix of benefits and burdens they offer to their residents. By increasing
information costs and uncertainty, a jurisdiction can lower the bribe it will have to pay to keep
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In addition to permitting tax exporting, spillovers enable a state to provide services
to its citizens without also having to pay for free riders. Any jurisdiction that offers
public services will be likely to attract migrants.92 Migrants may be from lower-tax
jurisdictions, or they may simply be latecomers who want to enjoy the fruit of the
state's earlier investments in developing the capacity and know-how to deliver a given
service. 93 One way the state can fend off the newcomers is to bribe them to stay at
home. And one way of offering a bribe is for the state to deliver its services in a way
that the would-be immigrant can enjoy without moving in. In a frictionless world, of
course, that would not result in any gains for the service-providing state; bribes would
have to equal the benefits of residency. 94 But our nation is not so slippery as that.
Moving is expensive, information about where and when to move is costly, and citizens
often overvalue what they have relative to what they might get.
95
Thus, producing some spillover benefits for neighboring jurisdictions in turn can
produce yet larger gains for the spilling state.
2. Why Not Zoning?
It might be argued, though, that states do not actually use bribes, because bribes are
an inferior tool for achieving the same ends that could be accomplished through
restrictive zoning. Localities can use zoning to force potential newcomers to consume
more housing than they can afford and to pay enough property tax to cover any
services they might consume.96 Here, though, we see a significant difference between
state and local incentives: the states, at least at present, do not zone.97 So bribery is a
significant factor in state-level fiscal decisions.
At the local level, many jurisdictions cannot effectively employ restrictive zoning.
Because exclusive zoning depends on restricting the number ofpeople who can occupy
a parcel of land, it is not useful in wealthy but already densely populated areas, such as
away newcomers. States should want to spend most on services whose value to outsiders is
especially opaque-education, for instance, seems a plausible candidate. See Bratton &
McCahery, supra note 25, at 236 (observing the difficulty for "consumers" in identifying the
quality of education a jurisdiction produces); cf Fennell, supra note 57, at 2-3 (observing that
legal scholars have struggled to measure quality of education services). This incentive is
significant for the impact of the deduction on the transparency of local government, as I detail in
the next Part.
92. See Katherine Baicker, The Spillover Effects ofState Spending 16-17 (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8383, 2001).
93. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Poverty, Residency, and Federalism: States' Duty of
Impartiality Toward Newcomers, 1999 SUP. CT. REv. 277, 304-07.
94. This is the case unless the service is a true public good-that is, its value to the
producer is not reduced by additional consumers.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 87-90. It is worth mentioning that the state cannot
choose simply to refuse to pay benefits to new arrivals. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 498-507
(1999) (holding unconstitutional California statute limiting new residents' welfare benefits to
the amount receivable in state of former residence).
96. See FISCHEL, supra note 58, at 51-57 (2001); Cashin, supra note 88, at 2012-13, 2015;
Fennell, supra note 58, at 68; Bruce W. Hamilton, Property Taxes and the Tiebout Hypothesis:
Some Empirical Evidence, in FISCAL ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS 13, 14-18 (Edwin S.
Mills & Wallace E. Oates, eds., 1975).
97. DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW 1-1 to 1-2 (5th ed. 2003); PATRICK J. ROHAN,
ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS 1-10 (Eric Damian Kelly ed., rev. ed. 2005).
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Manhattan or San Francisco. In other regions exclusive zoning is unlawful or restricted
byjudicial supervision.98 Although would-be migrants do not have standing in federal
court to challenge exclusive zoning in a jurisdiction where they do not reside, 99 a
zoning jurisdiction runs the risk that its state will take a broader view of the rights
cognizable in state court. 100 Further, zoning is not effective at shifting costs onto
neighbors who can afford to respond by moving into the would-be exporter. Exclusive
zoning also has social costs, such as lost diversity, that some jurisdictions may
recognize as significant.' Finally, it may be that bribery is cost-effective even in
addition to exclusive zoning.
In short, there looks to be little reason to think that states need to be encouraged to
generate spillover benefits. A good number of localities, too, are likely to internalize
many of the benefits of spillovers, because exclusive zoning is not a fully effective
alternative. It is not clear that we would want, or be able, to sort out those that needed
further encouragement. Indeed, the fact that the deduction facilitates spillovers should
give us some hesitation about the deduction generally, since it might, in turn, also
grease the skids for tax exporting.
D. Why Not Direct Spending?
From this sketch, it does not look like any of these three possible tax subsidy
arguments is particularly overwhelming. But suppose we thought one or more of them
was reasonably persuasive. We might then ask, with Professor Kaplow, why bother
with state taxes at all? Kaplow argues that direct federal grants to the states could serve
the same ends as the deduction without some of the attendant distortions. 0 2 Obviously,
the debate over using the tax system for policy objectives is a subject much larger than
I can do justice to here. An abbreviated glance, however, suggests at least some
potential role for deductions alongside direct expenditures.
Perhaps Kaplow's most trenchant argument is his claim that direct grants would
allow for more accountability on the part of state officials who take receipt ofthe grant
moneys and decide how to spend them.103 He may be thinking of the many strings,
including judicial oversight, that often come with federal grants. But, again, assuming
that is an attractive approach, it is at least conceivable to design a similar structure
around tax expenditures. 1 04 Consider two long-standing tax subsidies: the charitable
98. ROBERT R. WRIGHT & MORTON GITELMAN, LAND USE IN A NUTsHELL, 219-254 (4th ed.
2000).
99. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,502-08 (1975). Fiscal federalism theory suggests much
that is wrong in the reasoning of the Warth court, but that is a subject for another day.
100. See Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the "Passive Virtues ": Rethinking the Judicial
Function, 114 HARV. L. REv. 1833, 1836-37, 1852-59, 1881-97 (2001) (noting that state
courts sometimes take a broader view of standing than do federal courts, and setting out a
detailed rationale for that approach).
101. See Fennell, supra note 57, at 85.
102. Kaplow, supra note 4, at 484-86; see also Gillette, supra note 10, at 1067, 1074
(arguing that direct grants would be preferable to deduction for municipal bonds for subsidizing
local spending because grants would minimize distortions).
103. Kaplow, supra note 4, at 485-86.
104. See generally Mary L. Heen, Reinventing Tax Expenditure Reform: Improving Program
Oversight Under the Government Performance and Results Act, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 751
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deduction and exemptions, centered around section 501105 of the Code, and the Low-
Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC).106 Both offer potential models for how favorable
tax treatment can mimic the accountability and transparency of direct spending
programs. Under both programs, the IRS actively monitors the behavior of
recipients.10 7 While not all the results of the IRS's enforcement activities are made
public, the process of complying with IRS mandates produces vast amounts of public
information, such as the Form 1023s prepared by entities applying for exempt status
and annual Form 990 returns filed by those entities.1 0 8 These forms are now collected
online, 10 9 and offer taxpayers-as well as prospective donors or business partners-a
window into the finances, charitable objectives, and internal governance structures of
various charities. At the same time, the IRS is not alone in its enforcement and
monitoring efforts. Under both programs, the IRS draws significantly on the expertise
and eyes of the public 110 and regulatory partners-state attorneys general in the case of
exempt entities, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development and state
housing finance agencies in the case of the LIHTC."'
The analogy to exempt entities suggests another possible strength of subsidizing
states with tax deductions rather than grants: the size of the subsidy is dictated by
market decisions, rather than by Congress. Recall that one of the premises of the state-
subsidy rationale was that it helped to restore to states the political autonomy to set
their own fiscal policy, a freedom somewhat compromised by collective action
problems. That goal seems incompatible with direct subsidies: If the federal
government collects the revenues on behalf of the states, how does it know what
allocation of funds would duplicate what would have been the states' original
preferences? Once the money is collected, the individual states are unlikely to claim
that they are uninterested in distributing it to their citizens; no one turns down free
(2000); David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs,
113 YALE L.J. 955 (2004).
105. 26 U.S.C.A. § 170, 501-527 (2006).
106. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. &URBAN DEV., HOME and Low Income Housing
Tax Credits (LIHTC) (Aug. 30, 2004), available at http://www.hud.gov/offices
/cpd/affordablehousing/training/web/lihtc/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2007) (providing a review of
the LIHTC and its mechanics); Andrew Zack Blatter & Elena Marty-Nelson, An Overview of the
Low Income Housing Tax Credit, 17 U. BALT. L. REV. 253 (1988); Brian Galle, Preserving
Federally Assisted Housing at the State and Local Level: A Legislative Toolkit, 29 Hous. L.
BULL. 183 (1999) (discussing the tax credit in the context of low-income housing preservation
policy); Sagit Leviner, Affordable Housing and the Role ofthe Low Income Housing Tax Credit
Program: A Contemporary Assessment, 57 TAx LAWYER 869, 871-75 (2004).
107. See, e.g., MICHAEL I. SANDERS, JOINT VENTURES INVOLVING TAX-EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS, 416-38 (2d ed., Wiley 2000) (summarizing federal tax considerations in
LIHTC transactions); IRS, DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL PART 7:
RULINGS AND AGREEMENTS, available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part7/index.html (last visited
Mar. 25, 2007) (setting out IRS enforcement procedures for exempt entities); IRS, IRS Low
INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT DRAFT AUDIT TECHNIQUE GUIDE (June 1998) (on file with author).
108. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 6104(a)(1), (d)(1) (2006).
109. GuideStar, http://www.guidestar.org (last visited Mar. 25, 2007).
110. E.g., IRS News Release FS-2002-10 (Mar. 29, 2002), available at http://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-news/fs-02- I 0.pdf (describing the IRS's procedures for obtaining enforcement tips from
general public).
111. E.g., IRS Form 8823, Low-Income Housing Credit Agencies Report ofNoncompliance
or Building Disposition (2005), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f8823.pdf.
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money."l2 One possibility is that we could allocate federal money according to the
extent to which states actually redistribute their own money, much as the charitable
deduction in effect rewards charities in proportion to the amount of public support they
can garner."13 The current deduction superficially seems to do just that, since it rewards
states in rough proportion to the extent to which they impose their tax burden on
wealthy itemizers.
114
There is, however, a problem with this argument. State tax revenues speak only to
the intake side of the balance sheet; we do not know what states do with the money
they raise.1 5 It seems fairly plausible that states shift both taxes and services to high
earners. 16 That is, although states may tax more heavily because of the deduction, they
might not redistribute the tax income in the way they would have preferred absent
collective action barriers. Professor Stark argues to the contrary, claiming that many
state constitutions require some equity in education expenditures, and noting that the
U.S. Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, thereby putatively limiting a
state's ability to channel its tax dollars to selected groups.
1 17
With due respect to Professor Stark, these are unconvincing arguments. Federal
constitutional scrutiny of class-based state spending is minimal," l8 and is not
heightened by the fact that class differences may overlap with racial differences."
19
Notably, the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld large disparities in state allocations of
education spending. 20 State constitutional rulings have largely set minimum standards
for all school districts without capping what wealthier districts can spend on
themselves. 121 And there are few, if any, limits anywhere on how and in what
112. See Lynn A. Baker, The Spending Power and the Federalist Revival, 4 CHAPMAN L.
REv. 195, 201-04 (2001).
113. See David E. Wildasin, Income Redistribution in a Common Labor Market, 81 Am.
ECON. REv. 757, 761-65 (1991).
114. On the increasing value of the deduction to higher-income taxpayers, see supra text
accompanying notes 21-22.
115. To be a bit more precise, we do know that states for the most part do not spend their
money on programs typically defined as redistributive, such as pure transfer payments.
PETERSON, supra note 59, at 211. We do not have good data about the distributive effects of
other forms of state spending.
116. Cf Chernick, supra note 22, at 98 (finding doubtful, if any, correlation between
progressive taxation and progressive spending).
117. Stark, supra note 10, at 1426-27.
118. E.g., FCC v. Beach Comm., 508 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1993) ("Whether embodied in the
Fourteenth Amendment or inferred from the Fifth, equal protection is not a license for courts to
judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices. In areas of social and economic
policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes
fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is
any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the
classification.")
119. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297-99 (1987) (rejecting the argument that
facially neutral policy with incidental disparate impact on protected minority group violated
Constitution); see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-42, 248 & n.14 (1976)
(holding the same).
120. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28-44 (1973).
121. See Laurie Reynolds, Skybox Schools: Public Education as Private Luxury, 82 WASH.
U. L.Q. 755, 756-61 (2004); Avida Y. Cover, Note, Is "Adequacy" a More "Political
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neighborhoods a locality can allocate its money forjobs, policing, parks, clean streets,
filled potholes, or on how it chooses between services with obvious distributive
implications, such as highways versus public transit, workplace safety and health
inspectors versus securities regulators.' 22 Moreover, to the extent thatjurisdictions may
want to discourage free riding by indigent newcomers, the jurisdictions have an
incentive to allocate service dollars in ways that will benefit those with more wealth.
So allocation has no obvious workable shortcut, and it is a serious conceptual
problem. The deduction seems an attractive alternative to grants if its goal is to restore
spending discretion-and therefore political autonomy-to states hamstrung by
collective action problems. But it appears clear that any distribution of money for
redistribution will be allocated according to a federal formula highly unlikely to
capture the actual preferences of each state.
Another criticism of the deduction is that it may not be a particularly efficient tool
for delivering money to state governments. 123 Unlike a simple grant, the deduction does
not necessarily deliver money to states on a dollar-for-dollar basis; instead, it relies on
some alchemy of the political views of deduction recipients and responses by state
officials. The perceived after-federal-tax cost of a state tax to a state voter may be hard
to calculate, especially in light of possible future federal changes. This uncertainty
arguably reduces the value of the deduction in a way that cash in hand certainly does
not. However, the deduction might also actually buoy federal revenues. Remember that
the deduction, especially in its current form, is most valuable to high-income states. At
the moment, most of the highest-earning states are net federal tax exporters.' 24 The
deduction counter-balances that disparity (hence, the support ofMario Cuomo).' 25 And
the federal income tax is likely considerably more salient than most federal
expenditures, especially for higher-wage earners who do not receive Social Security,
Medicare, Medicaid, or AFDC benefits. Thus, voters in high-earning states may notice
their diminished federal tax burden rather more than they notice a collection of small
federal benefits. So, the deduction could make voters in these net-payer states more
willing to shoulder their high combined net tax burden. Cognitive biases, in short,
might allow the deduction to do much more work in facilitating federal spending than
its pure dollar value.' 2 6 But it could also leverage much less. More data undoubtedly
would be welcome here. We do know, though, that cooperative spending programs are
Question" than "Equality? ": The Effect of Standards-Based Education on Judicial Standards
for Education Finance, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 403, 409-11 (2002).
122. See Briffault, supra note 39, at 536; Clayton P. Gillette, Equality and Variety in the
Delivery of Municipal Services, 100 HARv. L. REv. 946, 950 (1987) (reviewing CHARLES M.
HAAR & DANIEL W. FESSLER, THE WRONG SIDE OF THE TRACKs: A REVOLUTIONARY
REDISCOVERY OF THE COMMON LAW TRADITION OF FAIRNESS IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST
INEQUALITY (1986)).
123. I am grateful to Professor Ron Pearlman for his thoughtful arguments on this point.
124. See Tax Foundation, Federal Taxing and Spending By State, available at
http://www.taxfoundation.org/taxdata/topic/92.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2007).
125. See, e.g., Boadway & Flatters, supra note 86, at 630-31; Daniel J. Mitchell, Heritage
Foundation, The Deduction for State and Local Taxes Undermines Tax Reform and Subsidizes
High-Tax States (July 25, 2005), http://www.heritage.org/Research/Taxes/em974.cfn (arguing
that deduction supports state tax revenues in richest states); see supra text accompanying note
41.
126. Indeed, depending on how effective the deduction proves at increasing federal revenue,
it might actually have federalizing, rather than devolutionary, net effects.
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not one hundred percent efficient, either, since they entail significant bureaucratic
costs. So it is not clear at the moment that the deduction is a comparatively inefficient
way of delivering federal monies.
On the other hand, it seems as though there ought to be room for both grants and tax
expenditures as tools of federal subsidy. Public choice theory and everyday experience
suggest it is probably very difficult politically to remove a large deduction, enjoyed by
politically powerful wealthy taxpayers, from the federal income tax.1 27 At least some
benefits financed through direct expenditure are not comparably resilient. Thus, tax
subsidies can be rather more stable than direct spending.' 28 That stability obviously
makes planning and reliance easier for those affected by the federal program. Further,
stability can save the federal government money. I have noted elsewhere that a
prospective regulatory partner contemplating working together with the federal
government in exchange for financial gain is likely to demand a premium for
uncertainty. 29 Changes in federal policy may lock the partner into continuing a course
that, while unprofitable, is less disadvantageous than abandoning sunk investments and
starting over. 130 The rational partner wants to be paid against the possibility of that
outcome.' 3 ' A more reliable federal promise, such as policies enacted through the tax
system, can make the uncertainty premium lower. In some circumstances these
127. See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of Offset Requirements
in the Tax Legislative Process, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 501, 518-19 (1998); Edward J. McCaffery &
Linda R. Cohen, Shakedown at Gucci Gulch: The New Logic of Collective Action, 84 N.C. L.
REv. 1159, 1200-1225 (2006); George J. Stigler, The Theory ofEconomic Regulation, 2 BELLJ.
ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971), reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ANTHOLOGY 399, 402-03
(Thomas 0. Sargentich ed., 1994).
128. See Gillette, supra note 10, at 1080 (noting that tax exemptions are "less susceptible of
political machinations that could disfavor certain localities" than are grants); Hines & Thaler,
supra note 72, at 223 (describing a behavioral phenomenon in which taxpayers are much more
averse to an increase in tax than they are favorably inclined to a decrease in tax of same
amount); Zelinsky, supra note 16, at 805. In addition to these political economy effects, a
deduction is more politically resilient than some direct expenditures as a result of some quirks in
the congressional rules. Whereas a deduction need only be enacted once, albeit subject to CBO
scoring, see PHILIP D.OLIVER, TAX POLICY: READINGS AND MATERIALS 1074-75, 1081-90 (2d
ed. 2004), discretionary spending is subject to annual appropriations, Sandy Streeter,
Congressional Research Service, The Congressional Appropriations Process: An Introduction
24-25 (Sept. 8, 2006), available at http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/97-684.pdf
This puts legislative inertia in the comer of the deduction, which requires an affirmative act of
Congress to shut it off. Further, direct grants must run a double committee gauntlet in each
House-they must both be authorized and appropriated. Bill Heniff, Jr., Congressional Research
Service, Overview of the Authorization-Appropriations Process 1-2 (July 23, 2003), available
at http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/RS20371.pdf. In contrast, tax subsidies begin
and end only in the House Ways & Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee. U.S.
House of Representatives Joint Committee on Taxation, Joint Committee Role in the Legislative
Process, http://www.house.gov/jct/rolehist.htm.
129. Brian Galle, Getting Spending: How to Replace Clear Statement Rules With Clear
Thinking About Conditional Grants of FederalFunds, 37 CONN. L. REv. 155, 195 n.244 (2004).
130. See id. at 192; David A. Super, Rethinking FiscalFederalism, 118 HARv. L. REv. 2544,
2564 (2005).
131. Galle, supra note 129, at 195 n.244.
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planning benefits and cost savings should make the deduction an attractive alternative
to grants, even if somewhat less efficient.
III. No Exrr?
And so it appears that the deduction is not without some appeal as a tool for
facilitating state spending. But is the deduction money well spent? I have implied
several times that the deduction may also affect state governance itself. In this section I
argue, apparently for the first time in the literature, that the deduction may well be
expanding state government at the same time it is undermining state government's
effectiveness. But I also acknowledge that there is some hope that we can make the
deduction more amenable to federalism and localism, by making it a useful component
of a broader system to reform some of the structural problems that plague governance
by many parallel, competing jurisdictions.
These questions about the quality of state governance arise because the deduction
significantly curtails interstate movement. For example, an individual taxpayer is
considerably less likely to move in order to escape subjectively burdensome taxes if
she perceives the deduction as lightening her burden, 132 especially if moving would be
costly and somewhat risky. More generally, by shifting some revenue from the federal
government to the states, the deduction may damper interstate movement by
encouraging localized investment. Although federalism provides many different
baskets of taxes and services, it paradoxically makes it harder to choose among the
baskets, and greatly magnifies the costs of ascertaining what each one contains.' If all
spending were national, each taxpayer would know that in moving from one state to
another she would be getting, roughly speaking, the same basket, and would not have
to research thousands of alternatives, compare them, and decide between them before
moving.
Many commentators would claim that diminished mobility will significantly reduce
the efficiency of state government. 34 In an ideal market, taxpayers will flee inefficient
or corrupt governments for those that deliver similar sets of services with less waste.'
35
Some writers predict that even in a more realistic model, in which we recognize that
there are significant frictions on interjurisdictional movement, intrastate politics can be
shaped by the threat of exit. 136 An important taxpayer does not have to actually analyze
all the costs and benefits of every possible other jurisdiction in order to claim credibly
132. See Briffault, supra note 39, at 545; Lynch, supra note 59, at 598; Stark, supra note 10,
at 1408 & n.72.
133. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 25, at 274 (describing informational problems
arising from existence of multiple jurisdictions).
134. See sources cited supra note 59.
135. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, OfProperty & Federalism, 115 YALE L.J.
72, 103 (2005); Bratton & McCahery, supra note 25, at 208-09; Briffault, supra note 39, at
540.
136. See ALBERT HIRSCHMAN, Exrr, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 44-54, 120-26 (1970) (noting
interdependence of exit and political influence); Timothy Besley & Anne Case, Incumbent
Behavior: Vote-Seeking, Tax-Setting, and Yardstick Competition, 85 AM. ECON. REv. 30-31
(1995) (analyzing so-called "yardstick" effect, whereby voters evaluate performance of local
politicians by reference to performance of neighboring jurisdictions); Bratton & McCahery,
supra note 25, at 264-65; Dorf& Sabel, supra note 61, at 319-20, 338, 348-49.
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that she will leave.' 37 All she has to do is find one other jurisdiction that delivers one
service more efficiently than her current home. The government of her home state does
not know that she has not analyzed all the other factors; for all it knows, she is
indifferent to them. Indeed, politicians have a professional interest in understanding
human nature, so our taxpayer's elected officials may guess that she might be
motivated more by heuristics than detailed cost analysis. These officials have a strong
incentive to satisfy the powerful taxpayer because although her one vote may not be
very important, her departure (and, of course, her campaign contributions) would be:
the lost revenue would hurt the state in ways that would cost the officials more votes,
and other citizens may look to her as an opinion leader.' 38 When all the wealthy
families leave (or threaten to leave) a neighborhood, few of the residents who remain
are likely to conclude that the government has been doing a good job recently.' 39 So,
again, exit can be an important mechanism in chastening local governments, even if no
one actually ever goes anywhere.
To this familiar argument I would add that mobility can also foster a form of
taxpayer participation in government by curbing tax exporting. For the most part, we
have no right to participate in the politics ofa jurisdiction where we do not reside, even
if it makes decisions that affect us, such as instituting a tax whose incidence we bear.
140
But as I have mentioned, we can force the exporting jurisdiction to take some
consideration for us simply by the threat of moving there in response.'14 That threat
may even give rise to negotiations between exporter and nonresident over what bribe
the exporter must pay to prevent in-migration.
It therefore is possible that the deduction undermines the efficiency and
participatory character of state and local government. The deduction diminishes the
chastening force of exit, undercuts the force of threats to depart, and weakens
incentives for jurisdictions to pay heed to the needs of neighbors affected by their
137. This point also has a broader significance for my argument. Many commenters on
earlier drafts observed that the deduction's effects on mobility would seem unimportant to the
extent that tax generally is not an important factor in individuals' decisions about where to live.
Several empirical studies are skeptical about the impact of local tax considerations on mobility.
See ALBERT BRETON, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 112-13 (1974);
Roger J. Vaughan, State Taxation and Economic Development, in STATE TAXATION POLICY 109
(Michael Barker ed., 1983). But see sources cited supra note 54 and accompanying text. And,
again, the skeptical studies take place in a universe (ours) where state and local taxes are
deductible, so they may in fact support my point that the deduction significantly diminishes
mobility. The more important point to take away, though, is that our working assumption is
already that actual mobility is limited. It may be the threat of departure that serves mostly to
chasten local governments, and that threat is less credible when state and local tax burdens are
deductible. See Benjamin Bridges, Jr., Allowances for State and Local Nonbusiness Taxes, in
ESSAYS IN FISCAL FEDERALISM 187, 214 (Richard A. Musgrave ed., 1965) ("[P]oliticians and
voters believe that changes in interstate income tax differentials significantly affect citizens'
choices of residence, place of work, and business location.").
138. See Fennell, supra note 57, at 26.
139. See G. BRENNAN & J. BUCHANAN, THE POWER TO TAX: ANALYTICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
THE FISCAL CONSTITUTION 178 (1980); Mancur Olson, Dictatorship, Democracy, and
Development, 87 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 567, 576 (1993).
140. See Kirk Stark, The Right to Vote on Taxes, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 191, 229 (2001).
141. See supra text accompanying notes 134-138.
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policies. These effects are particularly troubling if our main rationale for the deduction
was precisely to expand the range of services offered by local governments.
However, as the tax exporting example also suggested, mobility and exit also create
incentives for state governments that might cut against good government. The premise
of the efficient exit argument is that state government must be relatively transparent, so
that mobile citizens can recognize inefficiencies and move to avoid them, or threaten to
move if they are not repaired. 142 The trouble is that in order to frustrate migration, both
in and out, states may prefer to make the quality and kind of their services as opaque as
possible. Of course, individual officials will always want to be able to campaign on
demonstrable successes. But, in the absence of any benchmark for what constitutes
"success," and faced with substantial obstacles to acquiring that information, the
average voter will have no way of assessing claims by local officials that they have far
outstripped their neighbors.143 And the government can always deliver essentially
secret benefits-through zoning variances, property tax waivers, special regulatory
rulings, and other highly opaque avenues-to important constituencies.
One might argue, on the other hand, that jurisdictions should have an incentive to
offer good comparative data in order to entice wealthy newcomers. If losing successful
residents hurts officials' prospects for reelection, attracting prominent new ones should
help. Admittedly, this information will be limited. Since the jurisdiction will want to
attract only the wealthy, it is likely to compile only data about services that would be
attractive to that group, and not about, say, transfer payments. Information may be
screened in a way to keep it from those with modest means, such as by disclosing
exclusively through realtors or the local Chamber of Commerce, and/or by imposing a
small charge for access to the information. Moreover, information disclosure may not
be effective at attracting outsiders. Prospective migrants do not know how long the
transparent phase of government will last. 144 They may reasonably calculate that the
jurisdiction does not want them to leave, and the potential inflow of less beneficial
taxpayers may at some point outweigh the gains of continued openness, so that the
taxpayers enticed by the possibility of open and efficient government will be stranded
again. If that attitude proves widespread, there might never be a strong reason for the
jurisdiction to provide good data in the first place. So exit produces only somewhat
modest incentives for transparency, and even then only for some sorts of services.
The deduction does not help matters, and in fact likely makes information problems
worse. Recall that the deduction has little effect on the mobility of low-income
taxpayers. As we saw, a major reason states attempt to occlude the kind and quality of
services they provide is in order to exclude those low-income taxpayers. Thus, even
though the deduction reduces some kinds of exit, and exit in general creates an
incentive for opaque government, the deduction does little to stem a locality's desire to
obscure. The deduction does, though, reduce the mobility of high-income taxpayers.
That would make it harder for states to attract these high-earners through transparency.
142. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 25, at 208-09.
143. Cf Strahilevitz, supra note 39, at 970 (noting incentives for public officials to provide
public with misleading data about their own performance).
144. See Fennell, supra note 57, at 27, 71; Richard T. Ford, Beyond Borders: A Partial
Response to Richard Briffault, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1173, 1175 (1996); Jerry Frug, Decentering
Decentralization, 60 U. CmI. L. REv. 253, 266-67 (1993); Gillette, supra note 10, at 1078.
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The result is that the deduction actually diminishes any incentive for jurisdictions to
generate good information about themselves.
There is a bit of a bright side, though. Mobility may also damage local government
in two other fairly well-known ways. First, it will tend to undermine the possibility that
each locality will develop into a strongly connected community of principle, in which
the residents understand each other's needs and values and set policy after debate about
issues of shared importance.145 Secondly, the likelihood of frequent relocation may
tend to lead voters to make political decisions based on short-term needs rather than
the long-term interests of the community as a whole. 46 To the extent that it reduces
exit, the deduction helps preserve these two values.
On the whole, though, it looks doubtful that mixing the deduction with unmediated,
free-market federalism will lead to salutary developments in state governance. One
response to this situation would be to shift regulation to the federal government. 14 7 But,
obviously, that would often come at the expense of the experimentation and diversity
benefits that accompany independent local lawmaking. So at this point, the deduction
looks like a horrible choice if our goal is to encourage devolution or local
redistribution, and its negative effects on local governance are surely a concern if we
want to improve the equity of the federal tax base or achieve societal tax-enforcement
savings.
Over the last decade, however, a number of commentators have suggested tactics
for reforming federalism so as to cure some of the pathologies of its free-market form.
These proposals combine federal and state regulation, sometimes along with direct
popular participation, in an effort to gain the best of both worlds.' 48 The federal
government in these schemes serves as a sort of clearing house and analyst for good
governmental practices.' 49 For each policy, a federal agency sets out broad goals,
which states then may pursue through their own means, but with technical and in some
cases financial assistance from the feds.' 50 As state regulators on the ground gather
information about the nature of the problem and how to address it, they feed that
information back to the agency, which collects the data and rates the states according
to rolling sets of standards that are themselves revised in response to the developing set
of information.15' "Consumers" of the regulatory product-in other words, voters-
145. See Fennell, supra note 57, at 27, 71; Ford, supra note 144, at 1175; Frug, supra note
144, at 266-67; Gillette, supra note 10, at 1078.
146. See Cashin, supra note 88, at 2012.
147. Cf Shaviro, supra note 6, at 952 (noting that classic Madisonian solution to defects in
state governance was to shift regulatory authority to federal government).
148. See sources cited supra note 61; David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARv. L.
REv. 2255, 2340-42 (2003); Fennell, supra note 57, at 24-25 (describing user participation
systems generally, without limitation to those coordinated by a central authority); Jody Freeman,
Private Parties, Public Functions, and the New Administrative Law, 52 ADMIN. L. REv. 813
(2000) (describing collaborative regulation between government and stakeholders). Of course,
these commentators are hardly all of one mind. To the extent that I generalize, I mostly take
Dorf and Sabel as my exemplar, but other writers certainly take different positions on some of
these issues.
149. See Dorf& Sabel, supra note 61, at 345.
150. See id. at 345.
151. See id. at 323, 345-46, 350-51. Agencies can also provide technical assistance, by
analyzing relevant data and explaining how it can be used to solve problems. See id. at 323.
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then put pressure on their local governments to meet the standards achieved by other
jurisdictions. 152 Citizens can also participate throughout all levels of the project, 53 and
may serve as an additional force for transparency by exposing efforts by inside players
to game the system.' 54 The result, in theory, is a system that is at once open and
responsive to public input but also flexible; a system that involves localized
communities of principle but that submits their conclusions for comparison against a
wide variety of other viewpoints.
1 55
Exit and the threat of exit are still a problem for these collaborative systems,
however. In essence, collaboration faces a familiar tradeoff between "voice" and
"exit."' 156 The collaborative design depends significantly on active, well-informed
members of each community who will help implement each program, provide vital
ground-level data, check groupthink or self-dealing by insiders, and, most significantly,
study how their locality performs relative to others and demand that it match the
benchmarks set by others.1 57 But all of that is time consuming and costly. At the same
time, in the collaborative system, information is very cheap (because it is gathered by
the federal government) and usually rendered in a way that is designed to facilitate
comparisons. 158 That easy flow of information relieves one of the major frictions on
interstate movement. So in many cases it will be more attractive simply to move to one
of the better jurisdictions than to stay home and fix what is wrong. And that possibility,
in turn, may make some localities-especially those who expect that they may initially
lag behind others-reluctant even to participate in a collaborative project, or more
likely to game it and hide their results if they must take part to get federal funds or
other benefits. 159 If the most attentive citizens have already left, a weasely local
government puts significant pressure on federal regulators to require real
transparency, 160 a relationship somewhat at odds with the system's object of reducing
adversarial relationships between central and local regulators.
Cooperative theorists, recognizing this difficulty, argue that the threat of exit, again,
is an effective second-best alternative to actual exit. In a highly transparent system,
threats of exit by opinion leaders or revenue-generating taxpayers will be even more
credible, and therefore magnify the responsiveness of local governments to the
pressure of citizen scrutiny and comparison to national benchmarks.1 6 ' Additionally,
secret payments to these groups might be a bit harder. Although this view explains why
152. See id. at 319-20.
153. See id. at 316-19; Fennell, supra note 57, at 24-25.
154. See Dorf& Sabel, supra note 61, at 349.
155. See id. at 320.
156. See HIRsCHMAN, supra note 136, at4.
157. Cf Karkkainen, supra note 61, at 360, 363, 369.
158. Dorf& Sabel, supra note 61, at 321; see also Bratton & McCahery, supra note 27, at
235 n. 140 (observing that "the information problem could be ameliorated through central
government intervention").
159. Cf Dorf & Sabel, supra note 61, at 338 (noting that "some jurisdictions-or at least
their leaders-will be unwilling to exchange information for fear of showing poorly in
comparison").
160. Cf id. (suggesting that national regulators' role could be to encourage reluctant
localities to provide information).
161. See Dorf& Sabel, supra note 61, at 338, 348-49.
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the possibility of exit can enhance local government, it does not seem to completely
address whether exit itself might be damaging.
Thus the problem, I think, is in equilibrating the gains of the threat of exit against
the perils of actual brain drain. There is an obvious analogy here to debates over
voucher systems, both in education and in subsidized housing. Portable subsidies put
pressure on the service provider to keep its mobile customers. 162 But there is a certain
point at which mobility might deprive a foundering school system or housing project of
those engaged and capable enough both to recognize peril or to remedy it, and leave
the rest behind in a system that may be beyond repair without the aid of those who have
departed. 163 The risks in those two situations seem, at least to this writer, large enough
to be attractive only as a last resort. The difference in collaborative systems is that we
have other choices. Again, collaborative systems, it is thought, enhance the "voice" of
local citizens by involving them directly in regulation and providing them with low-
cost access to information they can employ in the political process.64 While the threat
of exit might further amplify that voice, it carries too the risks I have just mentioned. In
some situations, the risk that exit will collapse a locality instead of helping to reshape it
may be very serious, and perhaps hard to predict beforehand. In those instances, we
might prefer collaboration with relatively little possibility of exit.
It is possible that the deduction could help to create a low-exit collaborative
environment. As we have seen, the deduction blunts the impact of citizen mobility
without eliminating it. In the context of a collaborative system, we could view the
deduction as a payment to well-informed citizens-who might otherwise be tempted to
leave-to instead stay and lobby within their existing system., 65 Thus, it may help
assure that efforts to govern transparently and collaboratively can actually achieve that
end.
In short, although the deduction may have an uncertain or even negative effect on
state government at present, it may also serve some role in mitigating the risks of
hypothesized reformed systems of collaborative federal-state regulation.
IV. AN ENFORCEMENT INCENTIVE?
What we have seen so far raises some questions about whether section 164 makes
sense as a tax incentive. Here, though, I want to suggest another possible goal of the
deduction as tax incentive, one that, to my knowledge, has not previously been
suggested either in the economic or legal literature. The deduction, I argue, may
facilitate socially useful efficiency gains by allowing states to free ride on federal tax
enforcement efforts. 1
66
162. Michael H. Schill, Distressed Public Housing: Where Do We Go From Here?, 60 U.
CHI. L. REV. 497, 537-38 (1993).
163. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 136, at 45-52; Fennell, supra note 57, at 26-28, 78-80, 86;
cf Richard Schragger, Consuming Government, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1824, 1839 (2003)
(observing negative effects for residents left behind by out-migration).
164. See Dorf& Sabel, supra note 61, at 320.
165. For discussions of similar stay-put bribe techniques, see James M. Buchanan, Principles
of Urban Fiscal Strategy, 11 PUB. CHOICE 1, 1 (1971); Fennell, supra note 57, at 48; Clayton P.
Gillette, Opting Out of Public Provision, 73 DENV. U. L. REv. 1185, 1204-05 (1996).
166. In addition, to the extent that the deduction in fact increases the enforceability of state
tax provisions, rather than simply making enforcement cheaper, the deduction also increases
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The enforcement argument rests on three basic premises. First, it posits that tax
enforcement is expensive and difficult, but can easily be centralized at some savings if
different jurisdictions generally tax the same income base. Next, it claims that
notwithstanding this benefit states will ordinarily be somewhat inclined against taxing
the same base taxed by the federal government because, among other reasons, political
resistance to a single high tax is more substantial than resistance to several equivalent
small taxes. Finally, it suggests that the deduction, by mitigating this effect, can induce
states to shift their taxes to the base taxed and policed by the federal government.
A. The Benefits of Overlapping Enforcement
Effective tax enforcement is not cheap. 167 More importantly for my purposes, it
comes with very substantial overhead costs. An enforcing jurisdiction must develop or
recruit a team of expert investigators, analysts, auditors, and lawyers, many of whom
must be conversant not only in the substantive tax law of the jurisdiction but also in the
numerous ways that wealth or revenue may be invested, transported, exchanged, and
concealed. That challenge has grown exponentially with the rise of international
markets for capital and the development of overseas tax havens designed to make it
easy to conceal ownership of property. 168 The international aspect of tax enforcement
also means that it is not enough for states to be able to track and understand
transnational financial transactions; often, the enforcing jurisdiction will also have to
have some agreement with the foreign state in order to obtain any information from it
at all. In the case of tax havens, securing such an agreement can be a matter of some
delicacy-or, perhaps, one calling for some significant bluster.
As I have suggested, states can economize on these costs relatively easily by relying
in some measure on the federal government. 16 9 Commentators on international tax
arbitrage have already observed that foreign states may themselves depend on the IRS,
with its relatively sophisticated information gathering, computer data analysis, and web
of treaties, to collect information about the flow of international capital. 70 The same is
surely true of our fifty states. The feds have more leverage-such as, in extreme cases,
the threat of tariffs-to extract agreements from tax havens. 71 And relying on federal
enforcement efforts can save not only these sorts of overhead costs, but also the year-
horizontal equity. Lax enforcement, obviously, is inequitable in that some random taxpayers
may escape the payments that fall on others.
167. See Louis Kaplow, Accuracy, Complexity, and the Income Tax, 14 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
61, 61-62 (1998). As I go on to explain, in this section my references to the costs of tax
enforcement should be taken to mean only the governmental costs; the burdens of tax
compliance by taxpayers is a separate issue I largely leave for debate by others.
168. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International Taxation: A Proposal for
Simplification, 74 TEx. L. REv. 1301, 1336 (1996); William F. Fox & Matthew N. Murray, A
National Retail Sales Tax: Consequences for the States, 37 ST. TAX NoTEs 287, 291 (2005);
Steven Dean, Philosopher Kings andInternational Tax, 58 HASTINGS L. J. (forthcoming 2007),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfTn?abstract-id-941581#PaperDownload.
169. See Strahilevitz, supra note 39, at 981-82.
170. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, supra note 168, at 1337-38.
171. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (prohibiting states from enacting tariffs, absent
congressional approval); Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 150 (2d ed. 1996) (describing limits on states' powers to establish relationships
with foreign powers).
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to-year costs of auditing and litigating. 7 2 It is relatively costless for the IRS, once it
has detected that a taxpayer has failed to declare income from her Cayman real estate
trust, to turn that data over to state authorities. 173 Federal authorities can even punish
non-compliant taxpayers for violating state law; for example, some federal courts have
held that a sentencing court can enhance a tax offender's sentence based on the
combined total of state and federal taxes evaded. 174 Thus, the threat of federal
enforcement also greatly supplements the deterrent effect of individual state
enforcement efforts, leading to higher compliance even in cases where there is no
investigation by anyone.
Therefore, overlapping enforcement is an attractive goal for the tax system, since it
would eliminate inefficient duplication of overhead expenses across the nation. For
small jurisdictions, overhead may be so large that cooperative enforcement is the only
realistic alternative. 175 Overlap is therefore important even to jurisdictions willing to
pay their own way, because the existence of another state where enforcement is known
to be lax would be a sort of domestic tax haven, luring capital and other loophole
seekers.
It seems fairly clear, though, that to a significant extent these benefits are only
available if state and federal tax bases overlap. A state that derives its income from a
sales tax collected at retailers' registers has relatively little to gain from careful federal
auditing of individual income tax returns. It will spend lots of money, though, auditing
the books of its retailers (and, probably, their suppliers, as well).
Another benefit states can realize with overlapping tax bases is simplification. A
state with few disparities between its own tax system and the federal system can attract
capital with the promise of lower tax-planning expenses. 76 Although it may make
accountants unhappy, that low-disparity strategy obviously is considerably less
burdensome for ordinary taxpayers. 
77
As a result, we may well want to encourage states to rest a fair portion of their tax
burden on a base already taxed and scrutinized by the federal government. The list for
individuals at present is fairly short-income taxes, estate and gift taxes, and some
excises. That would transfer substantial wealth to the states, reduce tax-planning costs
to citizens, and prevent a serious potential source of interstate capital leakage. But, one
172. See Super, supra note 130, at 2595.
173. See Fox & Murray, supra note 168, at 291.
174. E.g., United States v. Powell, 124 F.3d 655, 663-64 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied 522
U.S. 1130 (1998); see United States v. Jordan, 66 F. App'x 488, 490 (4th Cir. 2003)
(unpublished decision); United States v. Karamanos, 38 F. App'x 727, 731 (3d Cir. 2002)
(unpublished decision).
175. See Fox& Murray, supra note 168, at 291.
176. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 25, at 273; Super, supra note 130, at 2594.
177. Shaviro, supra note 6, at 910, 919; see Fox & Murray, supra note 168, at 291. On the
other hand, as we saw in Part III, we should remember that the state in so doing also makes it
easier for out-of-state residents to evaluate the costs and benefits of living there, which may tend
to attract free riders or facilitate the flight of current residents unhappy with that balance.
Another potential effect of shared enforcement is that, as states all converge towards the
federal base, they also converge towards one another. See Fox & Murray, supra note 168, at
291. This Article is agnostic about whether that is a desirable end; Professor Shaviro has already
examined the trade-offs thoroughly. See generally Shaviro, supra note 6.
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might ask, if overlapping tax bases is so great, why should we need to pay states to do
it?
B. Obstacles
It turns out there are a number of good answers to our last question, some of them
theoretical, others a matter of practical politics. I will begin with what I think is the
simplest, the distortionary effects of taxation. Taxes, of course, affect behavior-thus
the entire notion of the tax incentive. Not all of these effects are socially desirable. For
instance, depending on how a tax system treats the income of married couples, a
progressive rate structure coupled with no imputed income from household work may
tend to cause married, potential part-time or low-wage earners to stay home.178 Those
effects are magnified if two jurisdictions tax the same sets of income in similar ways.
The deduction, however, blunts the incentive effects of state taxation by repaying the
state taxpayer a significant percentage (his federal marginal rate) of the state tax. We
could thus view the deduction as a way of permitting double taxation with somewhat
lessened distortive effects.
One irony here is that some tax incentive effects are desirable-again, that is the
whole point of a tax incentive. The deduction, therefore, may make it more difficult for
states to achieve policy objectives through higher taxes on select behavior. 79 That may
not be especially troublesome from a federal perspective; it helps to prevent states from
constructing tax incentives that work at cross-purposes with federal goals. But,
obviously, it may reduce the appeal of overlapping tax bases for the states.
Another theoretical problem the deduction may not entirely solve is the increased
risk to a state's fiscal condition that can come with taxing the same base as the federal
government. Suppose most state revenues come either from federal subsidies or state
taxes. In the event of an economic downturn that depresses federal revenues, the
federal subsidy portion of the state's budget will likely decline. If the state is depending
on the same source of revenue, its tax revenues, too, will be hit hard by the downturn.
A diversified tax base, like a diversified investment portfolio, could help the state
avoid some of that risk. It is unclear that the deduction does much to replace the
benefits of diversification. In the event of a fiscal squeeze, the deduction still comes
out of the same tightening federal budget the state was depending on for other forms of
subsidy, so that adjusting state taxes to draw more federal cash through the deduction
will only reduce other federal contributions.
Turning to more worldly political considerations, a potential downside for state
politicians in tying their own tax system to the federal system is that the link may also
178. See Lawrence Zelenak, Doing Something About Marriage Penalties: A Guide for the
Perplexed, 54 TAx L. REv. 1, 20-21 (2000).
179. That would not be true in a world of perfectly rational taxpayers in which every state
taxpayer had an equal opportunity to claim the federal deduction. In that situation, the state
could simply raise taxes by an additional amount necessary to offset the effects of the federal
deduction. Where the deduction is available only to itemizers, however, this might result in
overdeterrence of non-itemizers. Additionally, as we have seen, not all taxpayers view state and
federal taxes as completely fungible, so that a higher nominal state tax rate combined with a
deduction, despite being fiscally equivalent to a lower rate with no deduction, might be less
feasible politically.
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bind their political fortunes to federal policy.180 The 2002 and 2003 tax bills plunged
not only federal but also many state tax receipts deep into the red, because many states
explicitly tie their income and estate tax calculations to federal methods.'
8
'
Unfortunately for state office holders, many of those states have balanced-budget
provisions in their constitutions or are subject to harsh discipline from financial
markets and other political pressures, so that the legislatures did not have the luxury of
borrowing. 82 They got to raise taxes and cut services, instead, which naturally
endeared them to their constituents. 183 Of course, it is possible to tax roughly the
federal base without expressly mirroring federal provisions. That approach, though,
sacrifices many of the benefits of simplification-which is especially significant in a
competitive world if other states are simpler-and in some cases may produce a
somewhat different base. For instance, many states tax estates the federal government
leaves unscathed, 84 and, more significantly for present purposes, many estates the
federal government leaves unaudited. So getting the main benefits of overlap probably
entails some political risk. The deduction can help somewhat here, in that it may soften
the blow if a state is forced to raise its rates in response to enactment of new federal
deductions.
The most significant obstacle to overlapping tax bases, however, is the political
economy of taxing a single base at a much higher combined rate.' 85 A diversified set of
state taxes has the advantage that each tax may have a somewhat distinctive incidence,
so that the collective burdens of the tax are spread across different subsets of the state
population (or outsiders). If the state shifts its base to match the federal base, it is
concentrating the tax burden on that particular group of taxpayers, a group already
targeted by the federal government. Perhaps counterintuitively, this narrowing of the
tax base may actually increase political resistance to the state tax, even though it may
now be concentrated on fewer voters. That is because politics often depends not only
on the numerosity of voters but also the intensity of their engagement in the political
180. Cf Shaviro, supra note 6, at 926, 958-59 (arguing that local governments may have
incentive to diverge from federal tax system in order to maintain "their own power and
function"). I am grateful to Martin Ginsburg for making this point.
181. Timothy Catts, Bush's Tax Cuts Take a Bite Out of States'Budgets, 100 TAX NOTES
1098, 1098 (2003); Iris J. Lav & Andrew Brecher, Passing Down the Deficit: Federal Policies
Contribute to the Severity of the State Fiscal Crisis 2, 3 (Aug. 18, 2004),
http://www.cbpp.org/5- 12-04sfp.pdf.
182. Briffault, supra note 39, at 548, 554-55; see also Super, supra note 130, at 2555,2592.
183. John M. Broder, Despite Signs ofEconomic Recovery, States'Budgets are Still Reeling,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2005, at A12; Isaac Shapiro & Nicholas Johnson, TOTAL REVENUES FROM
ALL LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT DROPS TO LOWEST SHARE OF ECONOMY SINCE 1968, CTR. ON
BUDGET & POL'Y STUD. 3, 7, Jan. 15, 2004, available at http://www.cbpp.org/l -1 5-04bud.pdf.
184. Virginia Munger Kahn, Inheriting? Don't Forget Your State s Tax Bill, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 12, 2006, Money and Business/Financial Desk, § 3, at 24 (listing thirteen states in which
estates too small to be subject to the federal estate tax are taxed by the state).
185. Cf RONALD JOHN HY & WILLIAM L. WAUGH, JR., STATE AND LOCAL TAX POLICIES: A
COMPARATIVE HANDBOOK 31 (1995) (stating that localities prefer property taxes because that
base is not taxed by federal government); James M. Buchanan, Financing a Viable Federalism,
in STATE AND LOCAL TAX PROBLEMS 3, 11 (Harry L. Johnson ed., 1969) (claiming that there is
an inherent tradeoff between the ability of the state and federal governments to collect tax
revenues).
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process. 186 Engaged citizens will likely follow issues closely, be more likely to vote
based on their issue, lobby others, and, crucially, contribute money to support their
position. 187 Because of collective action problems, a tax that lands heavily on a smaller,
easily identified group will typically face more opposition than a fiscally equivalent
service cut that affects only slightly a large, diverse segment of the population.
88
This effect is exaggerated by the fact that the particular federal tax we would be
encouraging states to adopt, the income tax, is among the most visible. Researchers
have suggested that because of a bias known as the "availability" heuristic, taxpayers
prefer hidden, or less "salient" taxes to those whose incidence is obvious and well-
known to the payors. 189 Of course, it is not that the taxpayers really "prefer" hidden
taxes; it is simply that they do not oppose them as much. The income tax, in these
surveys, is usually among the most salient, and therefore least popular tax. 190 We all
know who pays our income tax bill. That increased awareness likely lowers the
threshold for activating potential voters, and makes it easier for them to find like-
minded opponents.
Interestingly, the bias against salient taxes implies that shifting state revenues to an
income tax will increase political opposition even if the shift does not change the actual
incidence of state taxes. In other words, even if the same taxpayers bear identical
proportional burdens under state sales, property, and income taxes, shifting to the
income tax with no net change in state revenue will make state taxes less popular. That
is one reason researchers have deemed salience a "cognitive bias"; it seems to have bite
even when the change in incidence is a fiscal illusion. 191
A similar problem is suggested by research showing that taxpayers will support a
higher overall level of taxation through a constellation of small taxes than they will
through a fiscally identical single large tax. Professors McCaffery and Baron term this
effect the "disaggregation" bias. 192 When evaluating any single tax, individuals tend to
focus strongly on that tax without being able to keep in mind its combined impact with
186. George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Scl. 3
(1971), reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ANTHOLOGY 402 (Thomas 0. Sargentich ed., 1994).
187. In this view of voting, called "public choice" theory, most potential voters are not
actively engaged in politics due to collective action problems and free rider effects. MANCUR
OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROuPS 21, 35
(1971). Acquiring the information necessary to act is costly, and each voter assumes that
someone else will adequately advocate their position for them. Id. Further, it is difficult to form
a successful political coalition, in part because it is hard to identify potential allies. Stigler,
supra note 186, at 402. However, free rider effects decline as costs become larger and more
visible. Id.
188. See OLSON, supra note 187, at 21-22, 31, 35; Stigler, supra note 186, at 401.
189. See MCCAFFERY & BARON, THINKING, supra note 68, at 5, 12-13; Christine Jolls,
Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1653, 1663
(1998) (explaining cognitive impact of more "salient" facts); George Loewenstein, Deborah A.
Small, & Jeff Stmad, Statistical, Identifiable and Iconic Victims and Perpetrators 2 (Stanford
Law Sch., John M. Olin Program in Law and Econ. Working Paper No. 301, 2005), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=-67828 1.
190. MCCAFFERY & BARON, REDISTRIBUTION, supra note 69, at 20-25.
191. See Shaviro, supra note 6, at 957.
192. MCCAFFERY & BARON, REDISTRIBUTION, supra note 69, at 9; MCCAFFERY & BARON,
THINKING, supra note 68, at 26.
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other tax and spending policies. 193 Thus, each individual small tax looks acceptable, or
in any event less unappealing than the single large tax, so that the taxpayer is willing to
accept a series of small bites that cumulate to as much or more than the big one.194 As a
result, depending on a state's political climate, attempting to shift from many disparate
taxes to principal reliance on the income tax may not be revenue-neutral.
At first pass, then, the deduction looks like it might be an effective counterweight to
these problems of political economy. Especially in its current incarnation, the
deduction disproportionately rewards wealthy itemizers. 195 But that is precisely the
group--small, easily self-identified, heavily impacted by higher state income-tax rates,
and (as evidenced by the capacity to itemize) relatively knowledgeable about tax-that
would be most active in opposing higher state income taxes. And, assuming state
taxpayers can integrate the effect of a smaller federal tax bill with the fact of a higher
state tax bill, it might soften the impact of other taxpayer biases. But that last
assumption already looks shaky, considering what we have already seen of the
disaggregation bias.
It might also be argued that political effects cut, not against the state income tax, but
instead against an overlapping federal income tax. If the unwanted burden is the
combination of state and federal taxes, it may be that political resistance will be aimed
at federal taxation rather than the smaller state piece. 196 State taxpayers might
rationally prefer to see taxing and spending on the local level, where their voices are
proportionately stronger and their control over expenditures correspondingly more
powerful. 197 Self-interested voters might prefer to keep taxes local because local
expenditures might look more like services and less like transfer payments to others.'
98
Even state programs identified expressly as "welfare" or transfer payments might be
seen as a way of purchasing insurance for the possibility of personal economic
downturns. The same program instituted nationally might look less like insurance
because the taxpayer may assume she is unlikely ever to be unemployed or without
health insurance in the many distant states where her tax dollars are now developing a
service-delivery infrastructure.
These tendencies might also produce reinforcing cognitive biases, such as through
the "generalization effect."'199 Some research, for instance, suggests that individuals
respond negatively to taxation, but have less negative views about taxing for many
specific programs. 200 The exceptions are categories like foreign aid, which are
193. McCAFFERY & BARON, THINKING, supra note 68, at 25-26.
194. MCCAFFERY & BARON, REDISTRIBUTION, supra note 69, at 30; MCCAFFERY & BARON,
THINKING, supra note 68, at 26.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 22-23.
196. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State
Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REv. 813, 865 (1998).
197. See Shaviro, supra note 6, at 967; Strahilevitz, supra note 39, at 932-33.
198. Cf Strahilevitz, supra note 39, at 942-43 ("[The perception that the revenues collected
by the federal government are used to benefit far-flung special interests undoubtedly erodes the
system's legitimacy, as well as compliance with federal income tax requirements.") One might
suspect that much the same point is actually made by Professor McConnell when he notes that
individuals are more likely to feel benevolent towards those near them geographically.
McConnell, supra note 59, at 1510.
199. MCCAFFERY & BARON, REDISTRIBUTION, supra note 69, at 7-9.
200. Id. at 39, 44.
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obviously transfer payments. 20 1 It is possible that the tested individuals "generalize"
their negative feelings about foreign aid to an undifferentiated tax. Similarly, taxpayers
might generalize from the negative aspects of national taxation, to the point that they
neglect some of the service benefits it provides them.
In this view, the deduction may actually be more useful to the federal government
than to the states. State representatives should happily free ride on federal enforcement
efforts, and let their congressperson deal with the headache of political groundswells.
The deduction could then be a useful tactic for federal representatives to maintain
support for existing revenue levels. Obviously, if popular responses to tax levels were
uniform and rational, it would be impossible for the deduction to be cost-effective on
that front. But again, the strongest and most energetic political opposition is likely to
come from exactly that group most benefited by the current form of the deduction. The
feds may not have to pay off the large group of relatively inattentive taxpayers who pay
higher combined rates. More empirical research is needed, but it is possible that the
deduction could, strangely, actually be a political expenditure from the federal
government to itself.
C. Will It Float?
Suppose, though, that we are convinced that political economy impedes states'
ability to rely on federal enforcement. How accurate is our first-glance take that the
deduction might mitigate the problem? Again, the answer on some level depends on
empirical data we do not have right now.
Remember our tentative thought that the disaggregation bias might limit the
effectiveness of the deduction in taking the sting from state income taxes.20 2 The
difficulty, again, is that when state voters consider a ballot proposition, or evaluate the
performance of a state politician, they may tend to focus on the burden of the state tax
alone, without considering the offsetting benefit they receive on their federal return. On
the other hand, many taxpayers file their state and federal returns at the same time, so
that they may be somewhat more likely to view the two as a whole.
20 3
These predictions may seem hard to square with other research, which shows that
states generally do adjust their tax base to take advantage of available federal
deductions. 204 A problem with relying on those studies for our purposes, though, is that
during the period of the studies, the federal deduction allowed credits not only for the
income tax but also property tax and, in some studies, sales taxes.20 5 Thus, the
taxpayers were getting a credit in a highly "salient" tax, the federal income tax, and
paying more in less salient state taxes. It is possible states were responding rationally to
a straightforward subsidy offer. But it also is possible they were somewhat irrationally
substituting hidden taxes for a salient tax, or some of both. As a result, the studies are
201. Id. at 44-45 (see Fig. 4).
202. See supra text accompanying notes 192-194.
203. I am grateful to Edward McCaffiey for suggesting this point.
204. See supra note 24 and accompanying text
205. Cf 26 U.S.C.A. § 164 Note (2006) (recounting history of statute, including 1986
amendment repealing exemption for sales tax and 2004 amendment reinstating it). Recall that
our object here is to induce the states to tax primarily the same base taxed by the federal
government, so we would not want to offer the deduction for property or sales taxes.
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only weakly predictive of what would happen if we were to try to replace federal
income taxes with equally salient state income taxes. Also, the studies do not seem to
track the durability of the switches they document. It is possible that a well-informed,
"rational" group of high-income taxpayers might lobby for the state to change its base
to capture the federal deduction, but that over time the rest of the taxpayers would
(irrationally) find the new tax so burdensome that they would demand it be switched
back.2
0 6
There are, though, two uses for the deduction that would seem not seriously
threatened by the possibility of fiscal illusion. One is its potential to soften the impact
of tax base consolidation on high-income taxpayers.20 7 A well-advised taxpayer is
highly unlikely to complain about a new tax structure that imposes fifteen percent more
state tax on her but gives her back twenty percent. The other use is that if the deduction
is actually a self-defense mechanism for federal legislators, the disaggregation bias is
not very important. Indeed, the disaggregation bias would help to make a discount on
the federal tax bill mollify taxpayers, even if the discount is not as big as the state bill
that, in theory, would otherwise threaten to crowd out federal revenue.
In sum, it is not clear that we need the deduction in order to get the benefits of
shared federal and state tax enforcement. At the same time, it is not clear that we do
not. More work in this field would be welcome. One thing that does seem reasonably
clear, though, is that to the extent enforcement is a justification for the deduction, it
should extend only to sources of state revenue that match the federal tax base. In our
current system, that would mean keeping the deduction for state income tax208 but
scrapping deductions for sales and property taxes.
CONCLUSION
I do not want to overstate my conclusions. One thing I believe this analysis has
shown convincingly is that the merits of the deduction are complex and may turn on
facts we do not now know. To tax ourselves we must know ourselves-but our minds
are still to us very mysterious engines. To shape our institutions we must know them
not only as they are now but also as they properly ought to be, a question that tax
policy alone cannot resolve.
Still, this Article contributes some promising new leads. I have shown that the
project of using deductions to shift spending to states and local governments is
206. Cf W. ELLIOT BROWNLEE, FEDERAL TAXATION IN AMERICA: A SHORT HISToRY 174-77,
182, 192-93 (2d ed. 2004) (describing how broad reforms of 1986 Tax Act were first enacted
through wide public pressure for reform, but then undermined by later bills enacted in spirit of
more traditional rent-seeking); Richard L. Doemberg & Fred S. McChesney, On the
Accelerating Rate andDecreasing Durability of Tax Refonn, 71 MINN. L. REv. 913,934 (1987)
(noting that broad-based tax statutes are often followed by a number of exceptions).
207. The extent to which a switch to an income tax would disproportionately impact high-
income taxpayers depends, of course, on the rate structure of the income tax, as well as whether
the old revenue stream flowed mostly from, say, largely regressive sales taxes or generally
progressive property taxes.
208. Another provision of the Code, allowing a federal credit for state estate taxes, would
also be justifiable under this theory. These moves would also be consistent with Professor
Shaviro's argument that greater uniformity across states would lead to productive reductions in
tax planning costs. Shaviro, supra note 6, at 911, 919.
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misguided to the extent that it includes a simple federal handover of money to those
governments. The deduction can substantially erode the efficiency, transparency, and
democratic character of sub-national government. Thus, using the deduction to effect
any shift to the states may seem almost cruelly mistaken, to the point where one is
inclined to wonder whether the whole enterprise is not simply an effort to produce
government that is so unlovely that citizens prefer to eliminate it entirely.
But this Article also demonstrates that entirely abandoning the deduction as a tool
of fiscal federalism would be short-sighted, for the deduction can also be a tool of
government reform. It can mitigate exit risks that might threaten experimentalist efforts
to build collaboration between states, private stakeholders, and the federal government.
And its relative political stability, and cognitive features, may make it more efficient
than direct spending at nationalizing federal policy.
If nothing else, the deduction has powerful effects on state tax policy. I have
suggested here a previously unrecognized goal for the deduction in shaping states'
approaches to tax policy: the possibility of societal gains from overlapping tax
enforcement also may establish a decent case for some targeted deductions. While
other potential benefits from greater state overlap with the federal tax base, such as
simplifying tax planning and compliance, have been treated before in the literature, I
add here that the deduction may be a mechanism for achieving those desirable ends.
However uncertain these beginnings, I think this Article is a success if it shows that
section 164 is about more than (boatloads of) money. The tax literature, while
recognizing in broad terms the significance of federalism for tax policy, has been slow
to integrate the insights of regulatory theory, which profoundly changes traditional
ideas of federal/state relations. And non-tax scholars have given little consideration to
the extent that, in a very real sense, almost all important federalism questions are really
questions about tax. Certainly, as we have seen here, areas we thought far removed
from tax, such as the effectiveness of local governance, prove subject to very
substantial tax influences. My work here implies that tax's gravity may tug on other
bodies in the federalism solar system as well. The doctrines of sovereign immunity,
qualified immunity, and Tenth Amendment limits on federal "conscription" of state
officials all spring, to some significant extent, from judicial concerns about the
transparency of, and lines of accountability in, state government.20 Even leaving aside
the revenue effects of federal tax rules, the influence of the deduction on state
incentives for transparency or opacity will likely seriously affect all three doctrines.
Further, the ways in which taxpayers understand and integrate taxes and spending has
implications for my previous work on the Spending Clause--explication of which I
leave for further work.
In short, what we should think about section 164 depends on much more than the
bottom of a balance sheet. Any fully considered judgment must include our philosophy
of mind, our plan for the individual states' place in an international marketplace, and
our optimal design for good local government. $75 billion? That's nothin'.
209. See, e.g., Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal
Antidiscrimination Law After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 512 (2000).
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